Three essays in economics by Bland, James R
Purdue University
Purdue e-Pubs
Open Access Dissertations Theses and Dissertations
8-2016
Three essays in economics
James R. Bland
Purdue University
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations
Part of the Economic Theory Commons
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.
Recommended Citation







This is to certify that the thesis/dissertation prepared
By  
Entitled
For the degree of 
Is approved by the final examining committee: 
To the best of my knowledge and as understood by the student in the Thesis/Dissertation 
Agreement, Publication Delay, and Certification Disclaimer (Graduate School Form 32), 
this thesis/dissertation adheres to the provisions of Purdue University’s “Policy of 
Integrity in Research” and the use of copyright material.
Approved by Major Professor(s): 
Approved by:
Head of the Departmental Graduate Program Date
JAMES R. BLAND








JOHN M. BARRON 6/28/2016
THREE ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS
A Dissertation





In Partial Fulfillment of the







For Ardian and Jamie.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Producing this kind of work is never an individual effort. I would therefore like
to thank the following people for thoughtful advice, assistance, and direction that led
to the completion of this dissertation, my ongoing sanity, and the planned work that
will hopefully follow.
To my thesis committee Tim Cason (chair), Jack Barron, Sandra Maximiano, and
Justin Tobias, thank you for being always approachable, but also letting me go off on
my own tangents unchecked for weeks at a time (there are sections in here that I can
attribute to a strict subset of those). Thank you for not letting those weeks turn into
months. Your comments along the way have helped me see the big picture of where
I’m going and how my work fits with more than I initially think of.
Nikos Nikiforakis is largely responsible for my conversion from a career in Engi-
neering to Economics, my pursuit of a Ph.D., and to do one in the US. He has also
frequently volunteered advice ranging from minute details of a paper to how I should
market myself as an economist. While I think I would have enjoyed being an engineer,
I am glad to have made the switch.
I am grateful for The Purdue Experimental Lunch group’s ongoing advice from
the beginning to the end of the first two chapters, as well as one failed attempt at a
field experiment.
I thank attendees of the 2015 Southern Economics Association meetings and the
2016 Midwest Economics Association meetings for comments related to Chapter 1,
as well as numerous attendees of my job market presentations.
I thank the attendees of the ExperiMetrix workshop in Alicante, where I presented
an early version of Chapter 2, for advice in the early stages of this project. Anna
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ABSTRACT
Bland, James R. PhD, Purdue University, August 2016. Three Essays in Economics.
Major Professor: Timothy Cason.
How Many Games Are We Playing? An Experimental Analysis of
Choice Bracketing in Games
A subject brackets two decisions if she “choose[s] an option in each case without
full regard to the other” (Rabin and Weizsacker, 2009). Although in most situations
such behavior is unlikely to be optimal, it is well documented in experiments where
subjects make decisions in the absence of strategic considerations. This paper uses an
economic experiment to investigate whether subjects also bracket their decisions in
games. Subjects played two Volunteer’s Dilemmas at the same time, with the payoffs
from both games added to their earnings. In a lottery task, subjects were generally
revealed to be risk-averse narrow bracketers. Aggregate play in the Roommate’s
Dilemma is not consistent with predictions made by assuming all subjects either
narrowly or broadly bracket. On the individual level, structural modeling suggests
that most subjects bracket narrowly in the game.
JEL codes: C91, C92, D03, D81
Mixture models of behavior and nuisance parameters: a semi-parametric
Bayesian approach (with Justin Tobias)
When there is more than one model of decision-making that could explain be-
havior in experiments, the mixture model is a useful tool in taking theory to data.
The estimation results can inform the researcher about the prevalence of each model
in the sample, and whether observable characteristics of subjects are predictors of
which model they use. Each model typically specifies a function describing behavior,
xvi
but also requires individual-level “nuisance parameters” that must also be estimated.
We demonstrate that restrictive econometric assumptions made on these individual
parameters can result in the researcher overstating the importance of type heterogene-
ity (subjects using different decision rules), when in fact the cause of heterogeneous
choices is subject parameter heterogeneity (subjects having different nuisance param-
eters). We propose a less restrictive assumption, and demonstrate its implementation
on some existing experimental data.
JEL codes: C11, C14, C51, D81
Keywords: Mixture models
Hospital-insurer bargaining power and negotiated rates (with Amanda
Cook)
In addition to risk-sharing, U.S. health insurance companies negotiate rates for
services with hosptials. The price of service can vary depending on which entity, if
any, is insuring the patient. Insurers (and possibly their customers) benefit from ne-
gotiating through lower prices, while hospitals benefit through higher patient volume.
Using Massachusetts’ Center for Health Information and Analysis (CHIA) data,
we use hospital and insurer characteristics to estimate negotiated prices specific to
hospital-insurer pairs. We investigate the relationship between two important quanti-
ties: (i) the charged amount that hospitals bill for their services, and (ii) the amount
that hospitals are paid for insured patients. These numbers differ because the former
is a function only of the services provided and the hospital’s “chargemaster” prices,
while the latter is the result of negotiation.
We find that payments for privately insured patients are on average 38% of charges
when payments are made on a fee-for-service basis. However this ratio varies greatly
by hospital and insurer. Compared to community hospitals without an emergency
room, academic medical centers are compensated 15% more for their services, and
hospitals with an emergency room are compensated 7% more than those without.
1
1. HOW MANY GAMES ARE WE PLAYING? AN
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF CHOICE
BRACKETING IN GAMES
A decision-maker who narrowly brackets and “faces multiple decisions tends to choose
an option in each case without full regard to the other decisions and circumstances
that she faces” (Rabin and Weizsacker, 2009). In some circumstances it is obvious
that there are benefits to making decisions jointly, and it relatively easy to make them
jointly. For example, one might aim to choose their favorite combination of shirt and
pants rather than their favorite shirt and their favorite pants; or one may aim to
choose the best combination of food and drink on a restaurant’s menu, thus avoiding
the possibility of consuming fish with red wine.1 Other times, either the benefits of
jointly optimizing are not so obvious; or they are clear to the decision-maker, but the
additional cognitive cost of optimizing jointly, or broadly bracketing, outweighs the
additional benefit. Tversky and Kahneman (1981), for example, demonstrate that
a significant fraction of individuals can be made to forgo certain amounts of money
when faced with paired lottery choice tasks. Indeed, it is rare that single decisions
can be made optimally without considering how they interact with the consequences
of other decisions. We are also frequently in situations where we need to consider
the actions taken by others, and hence we also need to think strategically about our
actions. This paper will analyze the intersection of the two aspects of decision-making
outlined above: (1) choice bracketing (Read et al., 1999), which involves ignoring one
decision while making another, and (2) strategic considerations.
To fix ideas, consider the following dilemma faced by two roommates. On a
particular night, there are two tasks that need to be done in the apartment: (1) Taking
1Or as a colleague recalled, ordering the unsurprisingly underwhelming pairing of fish and Coca-Cola
while at a job market dinner.
2
Table 1.1.: The Roommate’s Dilemma (two Volunteer’s Dilemmas). Any risk-neutral























out the trash (action T ) is critical, because if it is not done tonight the trash bags
will sit in the apartment for a week and create an unpleasant smell; and (2) washing
the dishes (D) is less critical because they can always be washed tomorrow morning,
but both roommates enjoy a tidy apartment, and so would prefer for the dishes to be
done tonight. Of the two tasks, taking out the trash is the more unpleasant. Such a
situation can be modeled by the “games”2 presented in Table 1.1. Each player can
either do the dishes (D) or not do the dishes (nD), and they can also take out the
trash (T ) or not (nT ). If a player is not risk neutral, once her opponent’s strategy
is known, optimization requires not only that she optimally choose whether to do
the dishes and whether to take out the trash, but instead which pair of actions she
should take. The decision to take out the trash cannot be optimally made in isolation
because for a subset of strategies that the opponent could play, some action pairs
result in distributions of payoffs that are second-order stochastically dominated by
other choices, and so would not be optimal for any risk-averse player. For example, if
she believes that her opponent will do the dishes with probability 20%, and take out
the trash with probability 40%, then not only is the action pair {D,nT} second-order
stochastically dominated by playing {nD, T}, but she would only realize this if she
considered both decisions jointly; that is, if she broadly bracketed.3 Each “game”
in isolation is a Volunteer’s Dilemma4 which can be used to model the decision to
veto an unpopular proposal (e.g. Holt, 2006). Therefore if one is looking for a more
2Here I use quotes around “games” because game theory treats this situation as one game. They
get treated as separate “games” when players narrowly bracket.
3This result is derived in Section A.1.3.
4See Diekmann (1985) for theoretical analysis, and Diekmann (1986) for experimental analysis.
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serious example, one could instead think of the Roommate’s Dilemma as modeling
the decision of which combination of unpopular proposals to veto.
Whether choice bracketing is relevant in strategic settings is an empirical question,
and this paper uses an economic experiment to investigate this. The Roommate’s
Dilemma is used as a testbed for bracketing behavior in games. I vary payoffs between
three treatments such that assumptions of narrow and broad bracketing make different
comparative static predictions. In fact, neither narrow nor broad bracketing predict
the observed treatment effects well at the aggregate level. I then elicit subjects’
risk preferences and bracketing behavior in a lottery choice task, where strategic
considerations are absent. Structural estimates suggest that the majority of subjects
narrowly bracket both in the Roommate’s Dilemma and the lottery task, however
bracketing behavior in one task does not predict behavior in the other.
1.1 Related literature
A set of choices are bracketed together when the decision-maker takes into account
the interaction of these choices, but ignores the effect of choices outside of this set
(Read et al., 1999). An agent broadly brackets if she considers the interactions of
all choices within her choice set, and narrowly brackets if she ignores some of these
interactions.
Narrow bracketing is well documented in lottery choice experiments by Tversky
and Kahneman (1981) and Rabin and Weizsacker (2009). Subjects in these experi-
ments made paired lottery choices similar to that shown below:
You face the following pair of concurrent decisions. First examine both
decisions, then indicate your choices, by circling the corresponding letter.
Both choices will be payoff relevant, i.e., the gains and losses will be added
to your overall payment.
Decision (1). Choose between:
A. A sure gain of $2.40.
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B. A 25 percent chance to gain $10.00, and 75 percent chance to gain
nothing $0.00
Decision (2). Choose between:
C. A sure loss of $7.50
D. A 75 percent chance to lose $10.00, and 25 percent chance to lose
$0.00
Rabin and Weizsacker (2009)
28 percent of subjects in Rabin and Weizsacker (2009)5 chose the pair of lotteries
A and D, which, had only one of Decisions (1) and (2) been payoff-relevant, are
consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) preferences. However
both decisions were paid, and simple calculations show that the pair of choices AD
induces exactly the same lottery as the pair BC, minus £0.10, indicating that the
lottery induced by action pair AD is first-order stochastically dominated by action
pair BC. The choice AD therefore cannot be rationalized with any expected utility
model that assumes more money is strictly better than less. When subjects were
presented the task as a choice between the four lotteries induced by the four possible
action pairs, not one individual made this error, suggesting that in the first task,
subjects either did not realize that there were benefits to bracketing broadly, or the
costs of doing so were too high. Similar effects have been found when subjects evaluate
investments over time. In these settings forcing subjects to consider a longer time
period makes them more willing to take on risk (Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Thaler
et al., 1997).
5Here I report the incentivized laboratory experiment of Rabin and Weizsacker (2009). Tversky and
Kahneman (1981) and Rabin and Weizsacker (2009) also report much higher frequencies of this pair
of dominated choices with hypothetical decisions.
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Rabin and Weizsacker (2009, p1513) suggest a simple model for such behavior
which can be taken to data. Players make I choices m = {mi}Ii=1 to maximize:6
U(m) = κ
∫




u(xi)dLi(xi | mi) (1.1)
where u is a valuation for money, F (· | m) is the distribution of monetary outcomes
conditional on choices m, Li(· | mi) is the distribution of monetary outcomes from
choosing action mi for Decision i, and κ ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of broad-bracketing.
That is, for κ = 1 the individual fully takes into account of the interactions between
their decisions, and for κ = 0 the individual narrow brackets. This model therefore
nests rational expected utility maximization (κ = 1) and narrow bracketing (κ = 0).
Choice bracketing is closely related to the treatment of background risk (Eeck-
houdt et al., 1996). Under reasonably weak restrictions on risk preferences, a risk
averse subject should be less willing to choose a risky option if his background risk
worsens. Ignoring background risk in the Roommate’s Dilemma is similar to nar-
rowly bracketing because these subjects will ignore the risk they are exposed to in
one game when making a decision in the other. In a field experiment, Harrison et al.
(2007) demonstrate that subjects typically do pay attention to background risk, sug-
gesting by this metric that broad bracketing should make better predictions in the
Roommate’s Dilemma.
Narrow bracketing is a more general case of mental accounting (Thaler, 1985).
Individuals who mentally account assign artificial budgets to different types of pur-
chases; for example, food and entertainment. If the price of (say) seeing a movie
increases, this individual would substitute away from movies and toward other forms
of entertainment. However their food consumption would not change, and so if movies
and popcorn are substitutes, they could be made better off by substituting away from
popcorn as well. Felsö and Soetevent (2014) identify shoppers who mentally account
between cash and gift certificate wealth. They surveyed shoppers after spending a
6An alternative but similar specification is made by Barberis and Huang (2009).
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gift certificate. Respondents typically indicated that while most (83%) would have
bought the item had they not received the certificate, among the remaining 17%, 78%
of these indicated that had they instead received a cash gift they would have spent
the money on a everyday purchase. This suggests that the majority of shoppers who
would have changed their behavior had they not received the gift certificate did so
not because of restricted consumption possibilities, but because they bracketed cash
and gift certificate wealth separately. While one typically thinks of mental accounting
and choice bracketing as behaviors that make individuals (weakly) worse off, brack-
eting could help to mitigate other “behavioral” shortcomings. For example Koch and
Nafziger (2016) shows theoretically that bracketing goals (such as weight loss) more
narrowly can help overcome self-control problems. The main driver of this result is
that loss-averse individuals cannot balance out losses and gains across brackets, so
they are more motivated to meet these goals. Therefore, in addition to lowering the
cost of decision-making, bracketing may be an evolutionary side-effect of self-control
problems.
While studies on individual choice behavior have documented this behavior well,
it is not directly clear that such behavior will also be present in strategic interac-
tions. Once opponents’ strategies are fixed, any game is reduced to an individual
choice problem in which the individual could be a narrow bracketer. Players may
be narrow or broad bracketeres, and may have beliefs about the bracketing ability of
their opponents. That is, individuals may play games differently to predictions made
by theories assuming only broad bracketers for two reasons: (1) they may narrowly
bracket, and therefore fail to recognize dominated action pairs as in the lottery choice
problem described above, or (2) they may believe that their opponents will narrowly
bracket, and therefore adjust their actions based on the behavior they expect their
opponents to take.
One study that could be informative on choice bracketing behavior in strategic
settings is Blanco et al. (2010). These authors analyzed whether subjects change their
behavior when there is a hedging opportunity available due to a paid beliefs elicita-
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tion task. Choice bracketing is important here because a narrow bracketer would fail
to recognize that by stating incorrect beliefs one could increase the minimum possible
earnings from the two tasks. In a sequential prisoner’s dilemma, subjects behaved
no differently when there were hedging opportunities than when there were not, sup-
porting narrow bracketing. On the other hand in a coordination game, when hedging
opportunities were more obvious, players not only recognized and used the hedging
opportunity, but post-experiment surveys revealed that subjects adjusted their play
in the coordination game because they thought others would recognize hedging op-
portunities. These results suggest that players may narrow bracket unless the benefits
from broad bracketing are obvious to them, and that observing play consistent with
narrow bracketing (and not consistent with broad bracketing) may be better explained
by whether subjects are able to recognize that benefits of bracketing broadly exist,
rather than that subjects’ mental costs of bracketing broadly are prohibitively high.
This paper is also somewhat related to the literature on game-form recognition,
which studies the effect of displaying games in different formats. McCabe et al.
(2000) observe more cooperation when a sequential-move game is presented in ex-
tensive form compared to when it is presented in strategic form; Chou et al. (2009)
demonstrate that deviations from game-theoretic predictions in the 2-person beauty
contest game (namely choosing weakly dominated actions) can be remedied by pre-
senting the game with a hint about the best response; in a non-strategic setting, Cason
and Plott (2014) demonstrate that the accuracy of elicited preferences is harmed by
subjects’ understanding of their task, but can be remedied through repetition with
feedback. Finally Cox and James (2012) study centipede games and Dutch auctions
presented in clock (standard for Dutch auction experiments) and tree (standard for
centipede game experiments) formats, concluding surprisingly that behavior is closer
to equilibrium predictions when the non-standard game-form representation is used.7
7It should be noted here that game theory’s treatment of the clock and tree format changes, some-
what, the definition of a strategy. Strategies in the tree format must specify an action even for
histories that the strategy rules out. The tree/clock treatment effect therefore may not be entirely
due to game form recognition.
8
In all but one of these cases, we observe treatment effects in strategic settings that
are not predicted by standard theory. If the representation effects in individual choice
experiments of Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and Rabin and Weizsacker (2009) are
also relevant in strategic setting, then playing multiple, payoff-relevant games at the
same time may have different outcomes depending on whether individuals are able
to integrate the lotteries induced by opponents’ strategies in the two games to fully
understand the distribution of payoffs, and that presenting the “games” in Table 1.1
separately may result in treatment effects inconsistent with standard models of ra-
tionality used in economics. While the current experimental design does not vary
the game form, one could hypothesize that there may be different representations
of the Roommate’s Dilemma which either reduce or increase the cognitive cost of
decision-making, potentially altering the results.
1.2 Experiment design
The purpose of this experiment is to determine whether narrow bracketing plays a
role in strategic settings, and whether narrow bracketing in non-strategic settings is a
predictor for narrow bracketing in strategic settings. To this end, I use a 3-treatment
between-subjects design, varying the payoffs systematically between each treatment.
These treatments are paired with a lottery choice task that aims to measure players’
risk preferences, as well as whether they narrowly or broadly bracket in the absence
of strategic considerations.
In the following discussion, I state the hypotheses as the intended null, and the
expected result of the test under the relevant assumption (i.e. either broad or narrow
bracketing). All hypotheses are designed to be testable with simple comparisons
of means between treatments, however logistic regressions are also used to provide
further insight and control for more factors.
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Table 1.2.: Treatments for the Roommate’s Dilemma. Payoffs are the sum of out-














































































1.2.1 The Roommate’s Dilemma
The purpose of this part of the experiment is to test comparative static predictions
based on assumptions of broad and narrow bracketing. The three treatments used to
test these assumptions are shown in Table 1.2. Note that compared to the Treatment
1, Treatment 2 adds 50 points to Γ1, and Treatment 3 adds 50 points to Γ2. All
other aspects of the games are identical. In all treatments, any mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium assuming risk neutrality satisfies (pA, pC) = (0.10, 0.35), however varying
payoff levels in this way will affect players’ incentives of they are not risk neutral. I
therefore proceed under the working assumption that players are not risk neutral, and
derive some comparative static predictions assuming that they are risk averse. This
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assumption can be tested either by comparing choice probabilities between all three
treatments: under risk neutrality they should all be equal, irrespective of whether
subjects broadly or narrowly bracket. Additionally, individual risk preferences are
elicited in the Lottery Task.
In order to test an assumption of broad bracketing, we can compare Treatments
2 and 3. This is because the payoffs of the full, 2-player 4-action game are identical.
A broad bracketer, having combined the payoffs of Γ1 and Γ2, would not distinguish
between Treatments 2 and 3 (in particular, she could see these treatments both as
“Treatment 1 plus 50 points”). Therefore, if subjects broad bracket in games, we can
expect to not reject:
Hypothesis 1 (Broad bracketing) Play in Treatments 2 and 3 are identical.
Narrow bracketers consider Treatments 2 and 3 to be different because they do
not add up the payoffs between Γ1 and Γ2. However for both Γ1 and Γ2 in Treatment
1, there exists an identical game in either Treatment 2 or 3. In particular: Γ1 is the
same in Treatments 1 and 3, and Γ2 is the same in Treatments 1 and 2. As narrow
bracketers will ignore one game entirely while making their decision in the other,
choice probabilities within a (bracketed) game will not change unless the payoffs in
that game change. Therefore, if subjects narrowly bracket in games, we can expect
not to reject:
Hypothesis 2 (Narrow bracketing, weak version) Play in Γ1 (i.e. pA) will be
identical in Treatments 1 and 3, and play in Γ2 (i.e. pC) will be identical in Treatments
1 and 2.
Furthermore, placing additional structure on risk preferences, one can make com-
parative static predictions based on narrow bracketing in the games where the payoffs
change. For example, by assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), the
following result can be used to show that adding points to a game will decrease the
equilibrium probability of taking the safe action in the relevant game (i.e. actions A
and C):
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Theorem 1.2.1 (Eeckhoudt et al. (1996), p685, Proposition 1) Suppose that
the individual has decreasing absolute risk aversion. A FSD [first-degree stochas-
tic dominance] deterioration in background risk would make the individual uniformly
more risk-averse if it takes the form of adding a negative noise that is statistically
independent to the initial background risk: ỹ2 =d ỹ1 + ε̃, with Pr[ε̃ ≤ 0] = 1 and ε̃ and
ỹ1 are independently distributed.
Therefore assuming DARA, a wide class of risk preferences, and narrow bracketing,
we can expect to not reject:
Hypothesis 3 (Narrow bracketing, strong version) Play in Γ1 (i.e. pA) will be
identical in Treatments 1 and 3, and play in Γ2 (i.e. pC) will be identical in Treatments
1 and 2. Compared to Treatment 1, pA will be higher in Treatment 2, and pC will be
higher in Treatment 3.
That is, broad bracketing and DARA predicts that compared to Treatment 1, pA
and pC will be lower in Treatment 2 and 3 respectively. For example, for narrow
bracketing and CRRA preferences (a special case of DARA), the mixed-strategy Nash




(100 + δ1)1−r − δ1−r1
(1.2)
which is strictly decreasing in δ1: the utility function is less concave at higher levels
of wealth, so agents are more willing to take on risk as their baseline wealth increases.
Finally, it should be noted that this design permits tests of the competing theories
not against each other, but against “something else”. Rejection of one of Hypothe-
ses 1-3 therefore is not support for the other model. While some may see this as a
weakness of the design, the author believes that this provides a more level playing




The purpose of the lottery task is to estimate subjects’ risk aversion and bracketing
behavior. In particular, for every subject I aim to elicit parameter κ (bracketing
behavior) from Equation 1.1, and the constant relative risk aversion parameter rR.
This is achieved through a convex budget set problem, where the subject must decide
how many tokens to assign to a risky investment. The risky investment pays out
χ > 2 times the number of tokens invested with probability 50%, and zero otherwise.
In order to pin down these parameters more accurately, subjects make decisions for
several different values of χ.
The lottery task is divided into two parts. In the first, the subject is asked to
make choices for just one payoff relevant investment. In the second, there are two
payoff-relevant investments. Therefore behavior in the first task is not affected by
bracketing behavior, while in the second it is. In total, subjects made four decisions
in Part 1 of the Lottery Task, and four decisions in Part 2. One of these eight decisions
was randomly chosen for payment. This avoids confounds associated with subjects
broadly bracketing across different instances of the task.
Part 1: Elicitation of risk preferences in the absence of bracketing consid-
erations
In this task, subjects are endowed with 100 tokens. They can invest any number
of these in the risky asset, which returns χ > 2 times the number of tokens invested
with probability 50%, otherwise asset returns zero. Subjects play four instances of
this task for χ = 2.25, 2.75, 3.50, 5.50, which were calibrated so that an individual
would invest half of their tokens if they had CRRA preferences of approximately8
r = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 respectively. That there is only one payoff-relevant investment
decision ensures that narrow and broad bracketers with the same risk preferences
behave identically in this part.
8χ is rounded off to the nearest 0.25.
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Ignoring the indivisibility of the tokens and normalizing the mass of tokens to 1,
a subject’s utility maximization problem in this task is:
max
x∈[0,1]
U(x) = 0.5u(χx+ 1− x) + 0.5u(1− x) (1.3)
where x is the fraction invested in the risky asset.
The first-order condition is:
0 = (χ− 1)u′(χx∗ + 1− x∗)− u′(1− x∗) (1.4)
For CRRA preferences, this reduces to:
0 = (χ− 1)(χx∗ + 1− x∗)−r − (1− x∗)−r
−r log(1− x∗) = log(χ− 1)− r log(χx∗ + 1− x∗)
r =
log(χ− 1)
log(χx∗ + 1− x∗)− log(1− x∗)
x∗ is strictly decreasing in r and strictly increasing in χ.
Part 2: elicitation of bracketing behavior
Subjects’ task in Part 2 differs from Part 1 only in that in each instance there are
two investment decisions to be made. In this part subjects have 100 red tokens, and
100 blue tokens. The red investment returns χ > 2 with probability 50%, zero oth-
erwise, and the blue investment returns χ > 2 with probability 50%, zero otherwise.
The success of these investments are independent. Both red and blue tokens count
toward a subject’s earnings.
Subjects play four instances of this task, with χ = 2.20, 2.50, 3.00, 4.00. As in
Part 1, these values were chosen so that a broad bracketer with CRRA preferences
r = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 respectively would invest approximately 70% of her tokens in
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each asset.9 Assuming DARA preferences, by Theorem 1.2.1 a narrow bracketer will
invest less than a broad bracketer who is equally risk averse. This is used to separate
broad and narrow bracketers. Targeting investments for the broad bracketers in a
reasonably higher region of the allowable range compared to Part 1 means that there
is substantial room for the narrow bracketers to reveal themselves before running into
the corner solution of not investing anything.
Predictions and simulation results
Figure 1.1 shows predictions in the Lottery Task for CRRA individuals for broad
bracketers (κ = 1) and narrow bracketers (κ = 0). These predictions are consistent
with the general predictions that (1) individuals who are more risk averse invest less,
and (2) individuals who bracket more invest more in Part 2 (i.e. Theorem 1.2.1).
Of particular interest in Figure 1.1 is the identification power for r and κ. For r,
performing Task 1 for only χ = 2.25 would, in principle, be sufficient to identify risk
aversion for all but the most risk-neutral individuals; however the four instances of
Task 1 provide a robustness check and will help mitigate the effect of noisy behavior
on estimation. For κ, by having several instances of Task 2, we increase the chance
of narrow and broad-bracketing predictions being widely different in at least one
instance for each type. For example, the blue lines in Figure 1.1 show the difference
between broad and narrow choices in Task 2. For χ = 2.2 there is a large difference
for low r, and for the other cases the difference is large later. This means that for
each r there is good separation of bracketing behavior in at least one case. While this
statement does not apply for individuals who are very close to risk neutral, I am not as
concerned with estimating κ for r this low because the benefits of bracketing broadly
over bracketing narrowly for these individuals are small, and zero for risk-neutral
subjects.
9Here I choose the higher target of 70% (compared to 50% in Part 1) because narrow bracketers will
invest less, thus ensuring a large variability of investment with bracketing behavior.
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Fig. 1.1. Predictions for behavior in the lottery task for subjects with
CRRA preference r and bracketing behavior. The dotted curve shows
predicted behavior in Part 1, which does not change with bracketing be-
havior. The solid and dashed lines show predictions for Part 2 for broad
bracketing and narrow bracketing respectively. Circles show the targeted
behavior for each case of the task, and the dash-dotted lines show the
difference between broad and narrow bracketing choices. For all targeted
preferences, this difference is a significant fraction of the action space for
at least one instance of Part 2, which makes separation of narrow and




Fig. 1.2. Simulation results for maximum likelihood estimation of param-
eters r and κ. Choices simulated with Logit precision parameter λ = 500
and the investment space restricted to multiples of 2% of the total tokens.
The mass of tokes is normalized to 1. Row and column labels show the
true values of the parameters being estimated.
The properties of the lottery task are generally born out in the simulation shown
in Figure 1.2, where estimates of r are generally very close to the true value, and
estimates of κ are more precise as r increases.
1.2.3 Implementation
The experiment consists of three parts: the Roommates’ Dilemma, followed by the
two lottery tasks. Before the beginning of each part, subjects are given hard copies
of their instructions (see Appendix A.4). These instructions are read aloud by an
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experimenter. Following this, subjects complete a questionnaire on their computers
to test their understanding of the instructions. In lieu of a show-up fee, subjects are
paid 20 experimental dollars (US$0.40) for each correctly answered question in these
questionnaires, irrespective of whether that part is randomly chosen for payment.
There were 12 such questions in total.
Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate population of Purdue University,
West Lafayette, who had registered for economics experiments using ORSEE (Greiner,
2015). The experiment took place in the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics
Laboratory at Purdue University between November 2014 and April 2015, and was
programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Overall, 128 subjects participated in
the experiment.
At the end of the experiment, subjects received feedback on all decisions that were
chosen for payment, were paid privately in cash, completed an unpaid survey, and
were allowed to leave the laboratory without interacting with other participants.
Part 1 – Roommates’ Dilemma: At the beginning Part 1, subjects were ran-
domly assigned into groups of four, which remained fixed for the rest of Part 1.
Subjects played exactly one treatment of the Roommates’ dilemma for 20 periods. In
each period, subjects were randomly matched with an opponent from their group, and
choose a pair of actions (i.e. one of A&C, A&D, B&C, and B&D) for that period. In
every period except the first, subjects saw a history table displaying their choices, the
choices of their randomly chosen opponent, and the frequency of each action taken
by all all four group members. Screenshots of all parts are shown in Appendix A.5.
The random matching encourages subjects to think about mixed strategies because
it is at best somewhat difficult to coordinate on pure strategies when one’s partner is
changing randomly every period. As subjects interacted within a group of four, each
group is an independent observation for the Roommate’s Dilemma, and analysis in
later sections of the paper will either cluster or aggregate to appropriately respect
this.
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In order to minimize hedging opportunities (outside of those available to broad
bracketers) while still making choices payoff-relevant, five of the twenty periods were
randomly chosen for payment at the end of the experiment.
Parts 2 & 3 – Lottery task: Subjects completed parts 1 and 2 of the lottery task
after completing the Roommates’ Dilemma part. One decision from the eight made
in these parts was randomly chosen for payment. If the randomly chosen decision
was from Part 2 of the lottery task, this was for both the red and the blue lottery.
Payments: As described above, subjects made six payoff-relevant decisions, plus
the earnings from the questionnaires. Experimental dollars were converted to US
dollars at a rate of 1 experimental dollar = US$0.02. In Treatment 1, payoffs could
range from US$0.00 to US$46.80. Treatments 2 and 3 add 50 points to five payoff-
relevant decisions, so payments in these treatments could range between US$5.00 and
US$51.80. All but (at most) US$4.80 from the questionnaire was earned through
decisions in the experiment. At the time of running the sessions, both the US and
Indiana hourly minimum wages were US$7.25. Sessions typically lasted about 75
minutes.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Aggregate play in the Roommate’s Dilemma
Result 1 Aggregate behavior in the Roommate’s Dilemma is not consistent with
broad bracketing.
Support: Figure 1.3 shows the aggregate choice probabilities between treatments
of all four action pairs. If broad bracketing were a good predictor of play, then in
line with Hypothesis 1 the gray bars (Treatment 2) would be the same height as the
white bars Treatment 3) While there is little treatment effect in the probabilities of
choosing very safe (AC) or very risky (BD) actions, the “in between” actions AD
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Fig. 1.3. Choice probabilities of all four action pairs in the Roommate’s
dilemma by treatment. Whiskers show ± one standard error. If play is
predicted well by broad bracketing, the gray and white bars (Treatments
2 and 3 respectively) would be the same heights.
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Table 1.3.: Permutation tests that choice probabilities from pairs of treatments are
equal. The first two rows show tests that mean group choice probabilities in Γ1 and
Γ2 are the same respectively, the middle four rows test combinations of actions over
the two games, again using mean group choice probabilities. The final two rows test
that the joint choice probabilities are equal. “Narrow” tests jointly that pA and pC
are equal across treatments, and “Broad” tests that pAC , pAD, pBC , and pBD are equal





standard t-statistic for testing equal means. The final two rows report a likelihood
ratio statistic, which would be asymptotically distributed χ23 under the null (the
asymptotic assumption is not required for the permutation test). 2-sided p-values
in parentheses are computed by permuting the samples 1000 times. The sample is
restricted to the final 10 periods for this analysis.
Action 1 & 2 Action 1 & 3 Action 2 & 3
A 1.418 (0.191) 0.618 (0.548) -0.878 (0.378)
C -3.897 (0.000) -1.685 (0.122) 2.280 (0.046)
AC -0.424 (0.712) 0.914 (0.383) 1.422 (0.170)
AD 2.941 (0.010) -0.125 (0.877) -3.210 (0.003)
BC -2.647 (0.011) -2.322 (0.047) 0.774 (0.454)
BD 0.897 (0.373) 1.261 (0.229) 0.458 (0.609)
Narrow (LR) 44.089 (0.000) 1.526 (0.479) 26.860 (0.000)
Broad (LR) 62.638 (0.000) 3.181 (0.373) 41.958 (0.000)
and BC are noticeably different. Specifically, subjects tend to play BC more in
Treatment 3, and AD more in Treatment 2. Table 1.3 shows tests for equal means of
a particular choice probability in two treatments. Of interest to Result 1 are the tests
reported in the rightmost column: the comparison of actions in Treatments 2 and
3. Broad bracketing predicts that there should be no significant difference between
these treatments, yet we see that action AD (as well as C) is played significantly
more frequently in Treatment 3 (two-sided p = 0.003).
Further evidence against broad bracketing in games can be found in Table 1.4,
which shows the results of multinomial logistic regressions of actions in the Room-
mates Dilemma, restricting analysis to Treatments 2 and 3. Of particular interest are
the bottom two rows of this table, which report a test of Hypothesis 1. In all but
Model (1), we reject this hypothesis at reasonable significance levels.10 It should be
10The failure to reject in Model (1) is unsurprising as the sample is restricted to actions in the first
period only, where play is most likely to be noisy, and the power of this test is low.
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Table 1.4.: Multinomial logistic regression of Roommate’s Dilemma actions in Treat-
ments 2 and 3, controlling for period effects in various different ways. AC is the base
outcome.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AD
Treatment==2 -1.387∗∗∗ -1.054∗∗ -1.058∗∗ -1.045∗∗ -1.063∗∗
(0.375) (0.332) (0.334) (0.360) (0.337)




Constant -0.575 -0.332 -0.0947 -0.102 -1.132∗
(1.057) (0.286) (0.277) (0.258) (0.495)
BC
Treatment==2 -0.224 0.169 0.165 0.0706 0.172
(0.272) (0.289) (0.294) (0.285) (0.299)




Constant -0.214 0.222 0.455 0.515∗ -0.374
(0.804) (0.238) (0.238) (0.219) (0.346)
BD
Treatment==2 -0.266 -0.211 -0.215 -0.0892 -0.212
(0.262) (0.266) (0.272) (0.297) (0.276)




Constant 0.563 0.693∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗ -0.312
(0.578) (0.213) (0.224) (0.231) (0.336)
Observations 760 1520 1520 1520 1520
Cluster level Group Group Group Group Group
Number of clusters 19 19 19 19 19
Period restriction 11-20 none none none none
Period dummies N N N N Y
H0 : T2 = T3, χ2(3) 14 27.1 27.2 11.2 27.3
p-value .0029 0 0 .0107 0
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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noted, however, that Hypothesis 1 is rejected not in favor of narrow bracketing, but
in favor of anything else: rejecting Hypothesis 1 here is not support for narrow brack-
eting, only support against broad bracketing. We now turn to testing the predictions
of narrow bracketing.
Result 2 Aggregate behavior in the Roommate’s Dilemma is not consistent with nar-
row bracketing.
Support: Figure 1.4 shows the choice probabilities in the Roommate’s Dilemma,
marginalized over Γ1 and Γ2. According to Hypothesis 2, narrow bracketing predicts
that pA should not change between Treatments 1 and 3, and pC should not change
between Treatments 1 and 2. Inspecting this figure, the latter is not supported by the
data. This is supported in Table 1.3, which indicates that C is played more frequently
in Treatment 2, compared to Treatment 1 (2-sided p < 0.001). This is not consistent
with Hypothesis 2. Additionally, note that Hypothesis 3 is not supported as there is
no significant difference between Treatments 1 and 2 in the probability of choosing
A, and no significant difference between Treatments 1 and 3 in the probability of
choosing C. In fact, if one also assumes that subjects are risk-averse, the probability
of choosing C moves in the wrong direction between Treatments 1 and 3.
These results are also supported by Table 1.5, which reports estimates from a
bivariate probit regression using the actions A and C as dependent variables. In
particular, the only action whose whose probability varies by treatment is action C,
which in Treatment 2 is significantly different from its base case choice probability
in Treatment 1. This pattern of changes, or lack thereof, between treatments is sup-
port against both hypotheses made assuming that subject bracket narrowly. Firstly,
Hypothesis 2 can be rejected because the Treatment 2 dummy on action C is sig-
nificantly different from zero. The joint test of all predictions made in Hypothesis 2
, namely that pA does not change between Treatments 1 and 3, and pC does not
change between Treatments 1 and 3, is reported in the final two rows of the table.
For all specifications we reject jointly that these probabilities are different. Secondly,
23
Fig. 1.4. Choice probabilities by treatment in the Roommate’s Dilemma,
marginalized over Γ1 and Γ2. Whiskers show ± one standard error.
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Table 1.5.: Bivariate probit regression of actions in Γ1 and Γ2.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A
Treatment==2 -0.221 -0.242 -0.245 -0.236 -0.249
(0.147) (0.130) (0.132) (0.149) (0.133)
Treatment==3 -0.0779 -0.0704 -0.0705 -0.0275 -0.0715
(0.135) (0.130) (0.132) (0.146) (0.133)






Constant -0.386 -0.324∗∗∗ -0.455∗∗∗ -0.470∗∗∗ 0.117
(0.232) (0.0893) (0.0929) (0.0967) (0.139)
C
Treatment==2 0.335∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗
(0.0838) (0.0763) (0.0778) (0.0773) (0.0780)
Treatment==3 0.131 0.0243 0.0245 0.159 0.0246
(0.0743) (0.0904) (0.0917) (0.0898) (0.0920)






Constant -0.315 -0.143∗ -0.280∗∗∗ -0.334∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.0626) (0.0652) (0.0653) (0.107)
athrho
Constant 0.387∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗
(0.0897) (0.0738) (0.0736) (0.0739) (0.0735)
Observations 1280 2560 2560 2560 2560
Cluster level Group Group Group Group Group
Number of clusters 32 32 32 32 32
Period restriction 11-20 none none none none
Period dummies N N N N Y
H0 : Narrow, χ2(2) 17.2 20.7 20.3 24.3 20.3
p-value .0002 0 0 0 0
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Hypothesis 3 is not supported since we fail to reject significant changes in either pA
moving from Treatment 1 to 2, or in pC moving from Treatments 1 to 3.
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1.3.2 Structural tests of behavior
While Section 1.3.1 tested the predictions of narrow and broad bracketing by
comparing treatment effects, this section pools data from all treatments and aims
to explain decision-making in both tasks on the individual level. Instead of forcing
behavioral parameters (such as those describing risk aversion and bracketing) to be
constant across the two tasks, I allow them to be different but possibly correlated.
Estimating a positive correlation between bracketing in the two tasks can therefore be
interpreted as subjects either bracketing broadly or narrowly in each task. I assume
that the behavior of subjects is characterized by five individual-level parameters:
rRDi , r
LT
i describe risk aversion in the Roommate’s Dilemma and Lottery Task respec-
tively. Here I assume the utility function: ui(x) = x
ri , ri ∈ R++.11
κRDi , κ
LT
i describe subject i’s bracketing behavior in the Roommate’s Dilemma and the
Lottery Task respectively, according to (1.1). These are binary variables taking
on values of 0 and 1.
γi models subject i’s learning about her opponents’ strategies during the Room-
mate’s dilemma. I use the model of Cheung and Friedman (1997) to describe
how subjects update beleifs about opponents’ strategies between rounds of the
Roommate’s Dilemma. Given a sequence of opponents’ actions leading up to






















For example, in period 16 subject i believes that her opponent will play action
AD in the next period with probability ŝAD,17. As in Cason et al. (2010), I
11Note that this is not the CRRA function used in the examples in previous sections, but is commonly
used in structural estimation of experimental data on risk aversion (see for example Harrison and
Rutström, 2009)
12See Equation 2.1 on p49 of Cheung and Friedman (1997).
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assume that γi ∈ [0, 1], with γi = 0 corresponding to näıve best reply to actions
in the previous period, and γi = 1 representing fictitious play beliefs.
To account for individual-level heterogeneity and the parameter restrictions, I







∼MVN (Xiβ,Σ) , κji = I(κ
∗j
i ≥ 0), j ∈ {RD,LT} (1.6)
where Φ(·) is the standard normal cdf, I(·) is the indicator function, X is a N × S
vector of subject characteristics, β is a S × 5 matrix of mean coefficients, and Σ is a
5× 5 covariance matrix. I restrict Σ so that the risk-aversion and beliefs parameters
are uncorrelated with the latent bracketing parameters:
Σi,j = 0 if i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and j ∈ {4, 5} (1.7)
Σi,j = 0 if i ∈ {4, 5} and j ∈ {1, 2, 3} (1.8)
I further replace an identifying restriction on the variances of κ∗RDi and κ
∗LT
i so that
they equal 1. Columns 4 and 5 of β can therefore be interpreted as the coefficients
of a probit model for the marginal distributions of the bracketing parameters. Im-
portantly, Σ4,5 = Σ5,4 ∈ (−1, 1) is the correlation between the latent variables. If
bracketing behavior does not vary across tasks, then we would expect Σ4,5 to be close
to 1.
For both tasks, I adopt a logistic choice rule, which for any two actions a, a′ in the
action space, the probabilities p(a) and p(a′) that these actions are taken satisfies:
log(p(a))− log(p(a′)) = λ[u(a)− u(a′)] (1.9)
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where λ > 0 is the choice precision. I allow the precision to vary by task, but not by
subject. These parameters are λRD and λLT .
I use a Bayesian approach to estimate the population parameters (β,Σ, λRD, λLT ).
Through the data augmentation process, I also obtain shrinkage estimates of the
individual parameters (rRDi , r
LT








i ) are the probabilities
that individual i brackets broadly in each task. Details of this procedure are outlined
in Appendix A.3.
Result 3 The majority of subjects narrowly bracket in the Roommate’s Dilemma.
The majority of subjects narrowly bracket in the Lottery task. Broadly bracketing in
one task does not predict broadly bracketing in the other task.
Support: Table 1.6 shows posterior moments of the estimated model. This model
estimates that approximately 17% of subjects broadly bracket in the Roommate’s
Dilemma, and 5% in the Lottery Task. These fractions are marginally different to
each other: the posterior probability that a subject is more likely to bracket broadly
in the game compared to the lottery task is 93.63% The correlation between the
latent variables for bracketing is not significantly different from zero at the 5% level of
significance. Analysis at the individual level reveals a similar story. Figure 1.5 shows
shrinkage estimates of the probability that each subject broadly brackets, sorted from
lowest to highest posterior mean. Error bars show a 95% Bayesian credible region.
Note that for the Roommate’s Dilemma on the top panel, almost all credible regions
allow us to reject that the subject broadly brackets with probability greater than
50%. Similarly on the bottom panel almost all subjects are most likely to bracket
narrowly in the Lottery Task.
Before turning to a richer model, we turn to the distribution of rRD, rLT , and γ.
Moments of the transformed variables in Table 1.6 show that the average subject is
risk-averse in both tasks (i.e. r < 1). This is relevant because the forgone utility
due to bracketing narrowly increases as utility becomes more concave or convex (i.e.
|r−1| large). Considerable heterogeneity is in these variables is demonstrated through
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Table 1.6.: Posterior means (standard deviations) of structural parameters.
Variable rG rL γ κG κL
Transform log log normal cdf probit probit
Mean coefficients β
Constant -0.9074 -0.4827 1.1945 -0.9838 -5.6477
(0.2033)*** (0.0497)*** (0.5751)* (0.2439)*** (4.1195)***
Moments of transformed variables
Mean 0.5708 0.6730 0.7624 0.1696 0.0485
(0.0776)a (0.0306)a (0.1317)a (0.0562)a (0.0746)a
Variance 0.3312 0.0851 0.0741 0.1376 0.0406
(0.2124)a (0.0195)a (0.0602)a (0.0370)a (0.0604)a
Covariance matrix Σ
rG 0.6749 κG 1.0000b
(0.2386)a
rL 0.1186 0.1714 κL -0.0948 1.0000b
(0.0494)** (0.0334)a (0.5806)
γ 0.4843 0.1130 1.5500
(0.4448) (0.1147) (1.3067)a
Logit choice precision
λG 0.0445 λL 0.4621
(0.0224)a (0.0787)a
* p < 0.050, ** p < 0.010, *** p < 0.001,
a Variable restricted to be positive. Significance stars supressed
b Variable restricted to one. Significance stars and standard deviation suppressed
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Fig. 1.5. Shrinkage estimates of the probability that each subject broadly
brackets in the Roommate’s Dilemma (top panel) and the Lottery Task
(bottom panel), sorted from lowest to highest posterior mean. Crosses
show posterior means, error bars show a 95% Bayesian credible region for
these probabilities.
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Fig. 1.6. Shrinkage estimates of behavioral parameters rRD, rLT , and
γ, sorted from lowest to highest posterior mean. Crosses show posterior
means, error bars show a 95% Bayesian credible region for these proba-
bilities.
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the estimated variance terms, and the shrinkage estimates of these variables shown
in Figure 1.6. A correlation of 0.3217 (0.1147) is estimated between (logged) risk
aversion in both tasks. We fail to reject a hypothesis that this correlation is positive
(posterior probability = 0.9957).
Result 4 In the Roommate’s Dilemma, subjects who bracket narrowly stood to lose
on average about 8% of their expected utility in certainty equivalent terms, compared
to bracketing broadly. Since most subjects actually bracketed narrowly, subjects on
average gave up approximately 7% of their expected utility due to narrow bracketing.
Support: Figure 1.7 shows estimated losses that could have occurred due to brack-
eting errors (panel a), and estimated losses that occurred (panel b). The vertical axes
in both panels show losses as a fraction of the optimized (broad bracketing) certainty
equivalent, that is:
CE assuming broad bracketing− CE assuming narrow bracketing
CE assuming broad bracketing
(1.10)
Averaging over all subjects, the potential losses due to bracketing errors (holding their
estimated beliefs fixed) was about 8% of the certainty equivalent of acting optimally
(see panel a). However this value hides considerable heterogeneity on the individual
level. Subjects with risk neutral (or close to risk neutral preferences) stood to lose
very little, and those with the most curvature in their utility functions 13 could lose
about 30% of the certainty equivalent. Panel b shows the actual losses due to brack-
eting errors, which were about 7% of the certainty equivalent on average, but on the
individual level were as high as 25%.
1.4 Conclusion
Economic experiments often produce results not well explained by standard eco-
nomic models. Such deviations in individual settings are in their own right interesting,




Fig. 1.7. Shrinkage estimates of forgone expected utility due to bracketing
narrowly. Panel (a) shows potential losses that would have occurred if the
subject had bracketed narrowly. Panel (b) shows the actual estimated
losses. That is, in panel (b) losses were zero if the subject was (estimated
to) broadly bracket.
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but their relevance in games is not guaranteed until they are directly tested. I study
one such observed deviation, choice bracketing, in a game. While this study, in line
with Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and Rabin and Weizsacker (2009), finds that
subjects’ decisions in the absence of strategic considerations are better explained by
narrow rather than broad bracketing, narrow and broad bracketing perform equally
poorly in explaining aggregate treatment effects in the Roommate’s Dilemma: treat-
ments that should appear identical to a broad bracketer are played differently, and
“games” that should appear identical are also played differently.
Structural modeling on the individual level finds that elicited risk preferences have
some explanatory power for play in the Roommate’s Dilemma, and the data seem
to be best explained by a majority of narrowly bracketing subjects. This suggests
that while assuming that agents best respond to something in games may not be
too restrictive, assuming that they best respond to everything at the same time is
probably wishful thinking for all but a small subset of the population.
While on average the estimated forgone utility of bracketing narrowly was small,
some individuals stood to, and in fact did, forgo a significant fraction of their utility by
making this error. How individuals bracket their decisions when acting strategically
may therefore be an important consideration, both for predicting behavior, as well as
for improving welfare.
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2. MIXTURE MODELS OF BEHAVIOR AND NUISANCE




One of the most popular motivations for running economic experiments is that
there is more than one model about how individuals behave in a particular environ-
ment.While in the past researchers may have considered these models as competing,
aiming to identify the one that best explains behavior, research now acknowledges
that each model could be “true” for different subsets of subjects. That is, each sub-
ject’s behavior may be best described by one of the models being studied, but this
model varies by subject. This motivates the mixture model, which assumes that the
data are generated by more than one model, and the econometric task of estimating
the fraction of subjects that behave according to each model.
One complication of this task is that models in economics are typically speci-
fied up to their parameters: the researcher wishes to distinguish between “Model
A” and “Model B”, not “Model A with given parameters θA” and “Model B with
given parameters θB”. As in Harrison and Rutström (2009) and Conte et al. (2011),
for example, we may be interested in knowing the fraction of subjects that behave
according to Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory, but may not care about
an Expected Utility subject’s degree of risk aversion. In the process of estimating
these fractions, however, we must also estimate risk aversion parameters for all of our
subjects (among others). Our assumption about how these individual-level parame-
ters enter our econometric model is not inconsequential. Wilcox (2006), for example,
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demonstrates that failing to account for heterogeneity in learning models can pro-
duce biased estimates of the model parameters that favor one model of learning over
another.1
Alternative models being studied in experiments frequently have different welfare
implications. For example, in discussing expected utility and prospect theory, Thaler
notes that:
“If I had an important decision to make – whether to refinance my mort-
gage or invest in a new business – I would aim to make the decision in ac-
cordance with expected utility theory, just as I would use the Pythagorean
theorem to estimate [the height of a] triangle. Expected utility is the right
way to make decisions.
With prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky set out to offer an alter-
native to expected utility theory that had no pretense of being a useful
guide to rational choice; instead, it would be a good prediction of the
actual choices real people make. It is a theory about the behavior of
Humans.” Thaler (2015, p29)
We may therefore be much more interested in the model that an individual uses to
make decisions, rather than the parameters that enter each model for each individual:
in Thaler’s context, individuals who use prospect theory to make decisions can be
made better off if they can be helped to use the other model. Individuals who already
use expected utility cannot be made better off (at least in this dimension), but their
decisions could look very different depending on their risk aversion.
One complication with estimating mixing probabilities is that for some values of
nuisance parameters, two or more of the assumed types could make similar decisions.
If one is overly restrictive about the way the individual-level parameters enter the
econometric model, it could be that the model achieves a better fit to the data by
1Wilcox (2006) demonstrates this with the task of identifying the “one best theory”, not for mixture
models. We use this example for exposition only and make no specific claims about their relevance
in mixture models.
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falsely classifying subjects into a different type. We show that mixture models that
are incorrectly specified in this way can lead the researcher to falsely conclude that
the data are generated by more than one type, when in fact all subjects are using the
same decision rule.
We treat these individual-level parameters as nuisance parameters: variables which
one must account for in one’s estimation, but about which one does not directly care.
Aiming to remain as agnostic about these as possible, we model them as draws from
a finite mixture of (possibly multivariate) normal distributions. We then specify a
data-generating process for an arbitrary experiment, and outline a Bayesian estima-
tor for simulating the posterior distribution of its parameters. Of main interest are
the parameters governing the mixing probabilities, which we model as a multinomial
probit. This allows for statements to be made about how these mixing probabili-
ties vary with observable characteristics of subjects, such as post-experiment survey
responses, and treatment variables. Through the data augmentation process of the
estimator, we also recover shrinkage estimates of the nuisance parameters and poste-
rior probabilities that each subject behaves according to each model. This estimator
is an improvement on the existing mixture model estimators used with experiments.
Like Conte et al. (2011), we account for unobservable parameter heterogeneity at
the individual level with a random coefficients specification, but with a more flexible
distributional assumption placed on these parameters. As in Harrison and Rutström
(2009), our estimator can identify how mixing probabilities change with observable
subject characteristics, but does not assume that the nuisance parameters are a de-
terministic function of these same characteristics.
We then demonstrate the use of this estimator on two existing experimental
datasets. We re-evaluate Harrison et al. (2010)’s assessment of the relationship be-
tween discount rates and smoking. We find that relaxing the econometric assumption
about their nuisance parameters (risk aversion and discount rate) leads to much wider
confidence intervals on the mixing probabilities: in our Bayesian framework the pos-
terior distribution is close to the prior. We can conclude only that the population
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is at least 11% hyperbolic. Since the 95% credible interval for this probability is
[2.2%, 45.4%] for non-smokers, and wider for smokers, we cannot say much about
discounting behavior. Harrison et al. (2010), on the other hand, estimate a much
tighter confidence interval of [18.3%, 36.0%].
Another advantage of our estimator is that it can accommodate more than two
types. We demonstrate this by revisiting Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001)’s experi-
ment, which documents differences in altruistic giving between male and female sub-
jects. We augment their structural analysis by allowing subjects to place different
weights on their partner’s payoffs in three other-regarding utility functions: selfish,
perfect substitutes, and perfect complements. We construct an overall demand curve
for giving for males and females, and use it to assign a posterior probability to their
claim that women are more generous when altruism is expensive, but men are more
responsive to price. We reject their econometric assumption that non-selfish subjects
place equal weight on their own and their partners’ payoffs, and find economically
significant heterogeneity in these weight parameters across subjects. This restriction,
however, does not significantly change the type into which we classify most subjects.
2.2 Literature review
That there could be more than one relevant model of decision-making should not
come as a surprise to experimental and behavioral economists. Alternative models
are frequently discussed in studies of other-regarding preferences (Engelmann and
Strobel, 2004; Bland and Nikiforakis, 2015), evaluating risky gambles (Rabin and
Weizsacker, 2009), and discounting (Andersen et al., 2014; Coller et al., 2012), to
name but a few.
Early treatments of alternative models of decision-making attempted to classify
individual subjects into types. For example, in a modified dictator game experiment
Andreoni and Miller (2002) classify subjects into three models of preferences over
their own and another’s monetary payoff: selfish, perfect substitutes, and perfect
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complements.Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) extends this type of analysis by dividing
subjects based on observable characteristics (sex), finding that men are more likely to
have perfect substitutes preferences than women. An implicit assumption made in the
analysis in these papers is that the non-selfish types place equal weight on their own
and the other’s payoff. They therefore subsume the problem of nuisance parameters in
their analysis. Hey and Orme (1994) classified their subjects according to 11 different
models of risky decision-making, estimating nuisance parameters separately for each
subject. This process significantly reduces computational burden relative to many
of the newer approaches discussed below, but does not capitalize on the information
contained in the other subjects’ decisions.
Harrison and Rutström (2009) demonstrate the implementation and value of mix-
ture models in experiments by estimating the fraction of subjects who behave ac-
cording to expected utility and prospect theory in a lottery choice experiment. They
outline the mapping between individual likelihoods of each model, to the grand like-
lihood generated through the mixing probability. In our framework, there are five
nuisance parameters: one in the expected utility model and four in the prospect
theory model. Appealing to the existence of correlation between these nuisance pa-
rameters and subject characteristics, the authors model the nuisance parameters as
a linear combination of subject characteristics Xi, that is:
θτi = Xiδ
τ (2.1)
where θτi is subject i’s nuisance parameter conditional on being type τ , Xi are their
characteristics (e.g. age, sex, race, etc.), and δτ are the parameters being estimated.
While this “linear regression” approach has appeal in that there is a very clear inter-
pretation of δτ , in that the coefficient on (say) age is the marginal effect of age on θτi ,
what it masks is the strong assumption made about the relationship between charac-
teristics and nuisance parameters: subjects with the same characteristics must have
exactly the same nuisance parameters in all models. For example, if the only charac-
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teristic used were sex, then the econometrician assumes that all female subjects have
the same level of risk aversion, probability of being an expected utility maximizer,
probability weighting function, etc. Indeed, Harrison and Rutström (2009, footnote
27) acknowledge this and suggest a random effects specification, which would conform
in our notation to:
θτi = Xiδ
τ + ετi , (2.2)
with some specified distribution of ετi . Such a specification, albeit not in a mixture
model, appears in von Gaudecker et al. (2011, see their Table 5), who also investigate
risky decision making. These authors find that the mean (Xiδ
τ ) and error (ετi ) terms
are both important in accounting for heterogeneity in choices across subjects. Har-
rison and Rutström (2009) admit that including both the deterministic and random
components in the nuisance parameters of a mixture model would add “considerable
complexity” to their estimator. For our paper we essentially add this random effects
term for a very flexible distribution of ετi , but shut down the Xiδ
τ component. Adding
this back in within the Bayesian framework is not particularly difficult.
Again investigating risky decision-making, Conte et al. (2011) focus on a mixture
model with expected utility and prospect theory decision-makers, but model hetero-
geneity of type (decision rule) and nuisance parameters as unobservable heterogeneity.
This specification does not allow for parameters to vary by subjects’ characteristics,
but adds flexibility differently by modeling the nuisance parameters as draws from a
multivariate normal distribution. Our procedure expands on Conte et al. (2011) by
relaxing the multivariate normal assumption of the nuisance parameters, and allow-
ing for the mixing probabilities to vary by subject characteristics (as in Harrison and
Rutström, 2009).
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2.3 Spurious type heterogeneity
At this point in the discussion, we consider the assumptions in Harrison and Rut-
ström (2009) to be economically implausible: it is likely that subjects’ preferences are
not a deterministic function of a few demographic variables collected in an economic
experiment. However we have not established that this assumption can lead to false
conclusions about the prevalence of types in the population. While we consider the
estimator used in Conte et al. (2011) to be economically more plausible with respect
to the nuisance parameters, this technique does not allow for the mixing probability
to vary by observables, and so cannot be used to identify subsets of the population
who are significantly more “behavioral” than others, outside of simple partitionings
of the data. In this section we demonstrate that mixture models that assume a deter-
ministic relationship between nuisance parameters and observables are very sensitive
to the number of types included, which in this setup is equivalent to adding some
simple nuisance parameter heterogeneity. We show using simulation results that this
technique can lead the researcher to conclude that there is a significant fraction of
both types in the sample, even when the data are generated with all subjects using
the same decision rule.
2.3.1 Harrison and Rutström (2009)
Mixture models estimated with the Harrison and Rutström (2009) method as-
sume that subjects’ nuisance parameters and mixing probabilities depend on their
observable characteristics only. One such application of this method is Harrison et al.
(2010), in which the authors use an experiment to elicit risk and time preferences, and
investigate the relationship between these elicited preferences, the type of discounting
a subject uses, and whether the subject is a smoker. Of particular interest to policy-
makers could be the fraction of smokers compared to non-smokers that are hyperbolic
discounters. If smokers are disproportionately hyperbolic discounters, then one could
attribute the decision to smoke as an irrational one, rather than the result of rational
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choice with different time and risk preferences. We therefore investigate the sensi-
tivity of the mixing parameters to alternative specifications within the Harrison and
Rutström (2009) framework. Table 2.1 shows the results these alternatives.
Column 1 replicates Table 5 of Harrison et al. (2010). Here, they assume that there
are two types: exponential and hyperbolic discounters. The nuisance parameters in
this model are CRRA risk aversion r, and discount rate δ. They assume that risk
aversion does not depend on type, but discount rate depends on type. As their only
explanatory variable in this estimation is smoke, a categorical variable equal to one if
the subject is a smoker, and zero otherwise, we can represent their assumption about












3I(τi = 1) + β
δ
4smokeiI(τi = 2) (2.4)
As in their Table 5, we transform the actual parameters estimated into risk aversion by
smoking status, and discount rate by both smoking status and type. The conclusions
from their estimation are that there are significant fractions of both exponential and
hyperbolic types in the population (they separately reject hypotheses that the mixing
probabilities are equal to zero and one. p < 0.001 in both cases.), and that smokers
are no more likely to make hyperbolic decisions than are non-smokers (p = 0.349).
We begin our extension by showing that alternative assumptions about the types
can generate better fits of the data. These alternative specifications are shown in
columns 2 and 3. In column 2, we assume that both types are exponential. The pur-
pose of this specification is to demonstrate the potential of drawing a false conclusion
about types by assuming the specification in column 1. Column 2 estimates that there
is a significant fraction of “Type 1”s and “Type 2”s in the population, however this
specification invites a different conclusion: as the assumed model for decision-making
was the same across these types (i.e. both types are exponential), one could use this
as evidence for heterogeneity in preferences. That is, between-subject variation in the
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Table 2.1.: Mixture model estimation from Harrison et al. (2010) experiment on
discounting behavior and smoking (column 1), and alternative specifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Risk aversion – r
non-smoker 0.792∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗
(0.0527) (0.0509) (0.0524) (0.0501) (0.0494)
- smoker 0.837∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗
(0.0534) (0.0548) (0.0525) (0.0503) (0.0528)
Discounting – δ
Type 1
non-smoker 0.0590∗∗∗ 0.0570∗∗∗ 0.0590∗∗∗ 0.0359∗∗∗ 0.0333∗∗∗
(0.00813) (0.00743) (0.00820) (0.00558) (0.00487)
smoker 0.0730∗∗∗ 0.0718∗∗∗ 0.0758∗∗∗ 0.0503∗ 0.0391∗∗∗
(0.00971) (0.00948) (0.0103) (0.0243) (0.00992)
Type 2
non-smoker 0.327∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗
(0.0439) (0.0340) (0.0429) (0.0203) (0.0184)
smoker 0.267∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗






Mixing probabilities – π
Type 2
non-smoker 0.272∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗
(0.0450) (0.0437) (0.0442) (0.0407) (0.0373)
smoker 0.379∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.459∗ 0.503∗∗∗






Choice precision – µ
Risk aversion 0.0673∗∗∗ 0.0749∗∗∗ 0.0658∗∗∗ 0.0687∗∗∗ 0.0725∗∗∗
(0.0161) (0.0156) (0.0161) (0.0149) (0.0149)
Discounting 0.00956∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.00920∗∗ 0.00675∗∗ 0.00695∗∗
(0.00332) (0.00307) (0.00323) (0.00225) (0.00211)
N 23008 23008 23008 23008 23008
ll -12241.9 -12198.8 -12245.8 -12159.4 -12132.4
Type1 Exponential Exponential Hyperbolic Exponential Exponential
Type2 Hyperbolic Exponential Hyperbolic Exponential Exponential
Type3 (absent) (absent) (absent) Hyperbolic Exponential
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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data is largely driven by subjects having different rs and δs, not by different decision
rules. Even more alarmingly, we note that column 2 achieves a greater likelihood than
column 1 (-12198.8 vs. -12241.9). It appears that going from one exponential type to
two exponential types buys more explanatory power than adding a hyperbolic type.
In the interest of including the exhaustive set of Harrison and Rutström (2009) style
estimations assuming two types, we also include column 3, which assumes that there
are two hyperbolic types only. By the log-likelihood metric, this specification does
worse than the one reported in Harrison et al. (2010).
We now turn to demonstrating that this type of estimation may lead to false
conclusions about the mixing probabilities. In column 4, we assume that there are
three types: two exponential and one hyperbolic. We are interested in comparing the
estimated fraction of hyperbolic types here to the corresponding number in column
1. In column 4 we estimate that a much smaller fraction of decisions, about 11%
vs. 30% in column 1, are hyperbolic. Depending on one’s opinion of what constitutes
an economically significant fraction of irrational types, one’s conclusion from these
models could therefore be very different. As this model nests column 1, we can use
the likelihood ratio test to reject the 2-type assumption in favor of adding another
exponential type.2 For the sake of completeness, we also include column 5, which
assumes three exponential types, and no hyperbolic types. Comparing the log likeli-
hood to column 4, it appears that swapping the hyperbolic type for an exponential
type buys additional explanatory power.
It is important to note here that we do not wish the reader to conclude from our
analysis in Table 2.1 that column 1, and hence Harrison et al. (2010), overstates the
prevalence of hyperbolic discounting in the population. Rather, we view our analysis
as demonstrating how the estimate of the mixing probabilities is very susceptible to
the assumptions made about the nuisance parameters: all of the mixing probabilities
in Table 2.1 should be taken with a grain of salt. If researchers are interested in
2χ22 = 2(12241.9− 12159.4) = 165.0, p < 0.001.
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making statements about mixing probabilities, we therefore encourage them to think
carefully about how nuisance parameters enter into their econometric specification.
2.3.2 A pathological example
In the previous section, we demonstrated that alternative treatments of the nui-
sance parameters can have large effects on conclusions drawn from the estimation
results. One plausible explanation of these varying results is that there is significant
unobservable heterogeneity in the nuisance parameters. Instead of the assumption
made in (2.3) and (2.4), consider the alternative assumption that:
θτi = µ
τ + ετi (2.5)
where µτ is the expected value of the nuisance parameter, and ετi is an iid, mean
zero error term. If ετi is drawn from a degenerate distribution, then the Harrison and
Rutström (2009) estimator is correctly specified, or at least the nuisance parameters
enter the model correctly. On the other hand, if ετi is not drawn from a degenerate
distribution, then this estimator makes a simplifying assumption.
This example demonstrates a possible cause of the varying results in Table 2.1.
Consider two competing theories about how subjects make decisions yi based on
treatment variable t. In particular, we are interested in two potentially relevant
theories:
1. Type A “linear” subjects maximize their utility by choosing y∗ = θAi t
2. Type B “log” subjects maximize their utility by choosing y∗ = θBi log(1 + t)
Since our subjects are humans, they make mistakes in their optimization, which we







i,t iid ∼ N(0, σ2) (2.6)
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Each subject makes T decisions for t = t1, t2, . . . , tT .
We wish to estimate πA, the fraction of linear subjects in our population. The
challenge in separating out these two types is that for t ≈ 1, log(1+t) ≈ t. It is there-
fore difficult to distinguish between them if the experiment only studies treatments
for t near one. This, of course, should be addressed with better experimental design,
in this case studying t sufficiently far away from 1. We focus on the case where the
experiment is fixed, and so the task remains solely an econometric one.
In our pathological example, there are only linear subjects in the population, but
half of these subjects have θAi = 1, and the other half have θ
A
i = 2. In terms of (2.5),
this corresponds to:
µA = 1.5, εAi =
−0.5 with probability 0.50.5 with probability 0.5 (2.7)
If we let πA be the fraction of linear types in our sample, we would like whatever
technique we apply to our data to produce an estimate π̂A close to 1. That is, we
may be concerned that we falsely conclude that there is a significant fraction of log
subjects in our sample.
Suppose that we apply an estimator that assumes no heterogeneity in the nuisance
parameters, and that we are lucky enough to know σ2, the decision error term. An
important quantity is the (log) odds ratio of a subject’s decisions conditional on being

















As this number increases, it is more likely that subject i is the linear type. Taking a






































2(yi,k − θBt)− θBo(t2)
]
where o(t2) = log(1 + t) − t is the error associated with the linear approximation of
log(1+t). In (2.11), for t close to 1, the first term dominates. In this case classification
of subjects into types is driven almost exclusively by differences between θAt and θBt.
Therefore, with our distribution in (2.7), the best our estimator can do is fit half of the
data to a linear function of t, and the other half to a log function. By assumption, we
have not given our estimator the opportunity to fit the data to two linear functions.
2.3.3 Simulation results
We now further explore the implications of (2.11) with Monte Carlo simulation.
We consider the implications making incorrect assumptions about the distribution
of types and nuisance parameters, and show that the correctly specified models ac-
curately estimate the mixing probability. We simulate data from the hypothetical
experiment described above, based on two cases:
1. There is one “linear” type A whose optimal choice is y∗ = t (i.e. θA = 1), and
one “log” type B, whose optimal choice is y∗ = θB log(1 + t).
2. There are two linear types. Type A’s optimal choice is y∗ = t (i.e. θA = 1), and
type B”s is y∗ = θBt
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Table 2.2.: Monte Carlo simulation results from example described in Section 2.3.
Values show the mean estimate of the fraction of linear types. Root mean squared
errors are in parentheses. These numbers were constructed with a simulation size of
5,000, with each run simulating 100 subjects making 20 decisions each.
True value of θB
Actual B Assumed B 0.5 0.7 1.3 2.0
log log 0.5003 0.5016 0.4999 0.5000
(0.0127) (0.0509) (0.0297) (0.0000)
linear log 0.5037 0.6119 0.8047 0.5001
(0.4965) (0.3970) (0.2217) (0.4999)
linear linear 0.5005 0.5008 0.5021 0.5000
(0.0122) (0.0577) (0.0569) (0.0002)
We perform this simulation for θB ∈ {0.5, 0.7, 1.3, 2.0}, simulating data from an
experiment with 100 subjects, exactly half of which are type A. Each subject makes
T = 20 decisions for t evenly spaced between -0.3 and 0.3. We use a decision error
variance of σ2 = 0.01, which we assume is known to the econometrician (in order to
speed up the simulation). Table 2.2 shows the results of this simulation.
The first row of this table reports the results from a correctly specified model
where there is one linear type and one log type. The estimator pins down the mixing
probability well, on average correctly estimating that there are equal fractions of
both types. RMSE increases as θB approaches 1, which is to be expected because
log(1 + x) ≈ x for x ≈ 0, and hence the experiment does not classify subjects as
cleanly.
The second row shows the result of simulating data with both types being linear,
but assuming that type B is log. Here the “true” mixing probability is still 50%, how-
ever we note that estimating πA close to 0.5 would result in the erroneous conclusion
that there are close to equal proportions of log and linear types in the population. If
a researcher were to blindly interpret π̂A this way, one would hope that this value was
not significantly different to one, and hence conclude that all subjects are linear. We
have therefore reported RMSE for this row by calculating deviations from a true value
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of 1, rather than 0.5. In reality, however, the simulation reveals that the estimate of
πA frequently leads to the wrong conclusion.
The third row of Table 2.2 shows results for the type B linear DGP with the
correct specification. As with the first row, as researchers we hope that the estimated
mixing probability is close to 0.5, indicating in this case that there are roughly equal
proportions of linear types, who can be differentiated by their nuisance parameter.
This is indeed the case.
2.4 A more flexible data-generating process
In the previous section, we showed that incorrect assumptions about the nuisance
parameters can propagate into incorrect conclusions about the mixing probabilities.
One solution to this, as used in von Gaudecker et al. (2011), is to individually esti-
mate the nuisance parameters for each subject. However to achieve accurate estimates
of these, we often need long, expensive experiments. Instead, we use a hierarchical
specification, where nuisance parameters are drawn from a specified population dis-
tribution. In Conte et al. (2011) this is a multivariate normal distribution. We relax
this assumption further in assumed data-generating process described below.
In an experiment, subject i takes Ji actions ai = {ai,j}Jij=1.
There are T types of subject. Each type is a functional form describing a subject’s
behavior. We model this as a likelihood function lτ (a, | z, θτi , γ), where a is the action
taken by a subject, z is a treatment condition, θτi is a set of behavioral parameters that
describe subject i’s behavior conditional on being type τ , and γ is a set of parameters
common to all types.
We model the determination of types as a (iff T ≥ 3, multinomial) probit, and
let β represent this parameter of interest. Σ is the covariance matrix of the under-
lying latent process (discussed below) determining types. We impose the identifying
restriction ΣT−1,T−1 = 1.
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Conditional on being type τ , parameter θτi is an iid draw from distribution fτ (θ).
As the aim of this study is to estimate β, and not θ, we wish to remain as agnostic as
possible about this distribution. Hence, we opt for the semi-parametric approach of





ψτ,cφ (θ;µτ,c, ντ,c) (2.12)
where (µτ,c, ντ,c) are the mean and variance for component c in type τ , and ψτ is the
vector of mixing probabilities for type τ .
2.5 Bayesian implementation
We specify priors on all parameters (β,Σ, γ, ψ, µ, ν) and estimate their posterior
distribution using data augmentation and Gibbs sampling. This technique involves
first defining latent variables for the censored data, then deriving (or otherwise sim-
ulating) the posterior distribution of all parameters, conditional on all others.
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2.5.1 Latent variables
We adopt the latent variables approach to the multinomial probity for τi:
τ ∗i | β, γ, ψ, µ, ν, θ ∼ iid N (Xβ,Σ) (2.13)
τi =

1 if arg maxk{τ ∗i,k} = 1
...
...
t if arg maxk{τ ∗i,k} = t
...
...
T − 1 if arg maxk{τ ∗i,k} = T − 1
T otherwise
(2.14)
Furthermore, as τi is not observed, it is also a latent variable.
Additionally, we let ci,τ indicate the component that subject i’s parameters were
drawn from.
2.5.2 Augmented likelihood function and posterior distribution
In addition to the model parameters (β,Σ, γ, ψ, µ, ν), we augment the data with
{τ ∗i , τi, ci,τi , θi}Ni=1. Therefore, we can define the augmented likelihood function of
observing data {ai,j}:




I(τi = arg max
k











where I(·) is the indicator function. Combining this with priors on the relevant
variables yields the the posterior distribution:




I(τi = arg max
k











We adopt the following prior distributions, which admit conjugate posterior dis-
tributions.
Conditional posterior distribution of parameters determining types
Parameters (β,Σ) determine the probability that a subject behaves according to
each type. Latent parameters (τ ∗, τ) govern this process.
Latent type parameters (τ ∗, τ): In order to draw these parameters conditional
on all others, we use the following result:
p(τ ∗i , τi | F ) = p(τ ∗i | τi, F )p(τi | F ) (2.17)
where: F = β,Σ, γ, ψ, µ, ν, τ ∗−i, τ−i, c, θ, a
In the first step, we draw τi | F :
p(τi | F ) ∝ lτ (ai | z, θτi , γ)p(τi | F − ai) (2.18)
Here p(τ | F − ai) is the probability subject i is type τ , but unconditional on their
actions. In the simplest mixture model case where T = 2, this would be p(τi = 1 |
52
F − ai) = Φ(Xiβ), the probit prediction probability, in the multivariate case this is
the multivariate probit analog:
p(τi = k | F − ai) =

p(k = arg maxj{τ ∗j } ∩ τ ∗j ≥ 0) if k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T − 1}
p(maxj{τ ∗j } < 0) if k = T
0 otherwise
(2.19)
As τi can only take on T possible values, we evaluate (2.18) at all of these, and divide
by the sum to get the desired pmf of τi, then draw from this.
Given τi, τ
∗
i is a draw from a truncated multivariate normal distribution with
mean Xiβ and covariance Σ such that element τi is the maximum, unless τi = T , in
which case all elements are less than zero.













I(ΣT−1,T−1 = 1) (2.21)
Inspection of (2.16) yields that the conditional posterior distribution of these param-
eters is proportional to:
p(β,Σ | γ, ψ, µ, ν, τ ∗, τ, c, θ, a) ∝
N∏
i=1
φ(τ ∗i ;Xiβ,Σ)p(β)p(Σ) (2.22)
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which yields the standard results:3






















(τ ∗i − Ziβ)(τ ∗i − Ziβ)′
]−1
, N + ρ
 (2.26)
Parameters governing the distributions of θτi
Component parameters cτi : The “priors” for these variables are captured by the
component mixing parameters ψ:








c )lτ (ai | z, θτi , γ) (2.27)
By noting that cτi can only take on integers between 1 and Cτ , this conditional
distribution can be calculated by evaluating the right-hand side of (2.27) at these
integers, and dividing by the sum of the results.
3See for example Koop et al. (2007) exercise 14.7 for the derivation. Here we make the transform:
Zi =

Xi 0 . . . 0





0 0 . . . Xi

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Component mixing parameters ψ: By using the prior:
ψτ ∼ Dirichlet
(
ατ,1, ατ,2, . . . , ατ,Cτ
)
(2.28)
the posterior distribution is proportional to:









I(τi = τ)I(ci = k)
Component distribution parameters (µ, ν): The section of (2.16) proportional
to each components’ parameters (µc, νc) is:
p(µτc , ν
τ























then the posterior distributions are:
µτc |β,Σ−1, γ, ψ, µ−c, ν, τ ∗, τ, c, θ, a ∼ N (Dµdµ, Dµ) (2.34)
where: Dµ =
[






























































i = c) (2.39)
Parameters without a known conditional posterior:
Without being more specific about how common parameter γ and individual be-
havioral parameters θτi enter into the decision-making problem, conditional posterior
distributions cannot be derived. In these cases we opt for rejection sampling using the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, which requires only that the target density be known
up to a constant of proportionality. Inspection of (2.16) yields that:
p(θτi | β,Σ−1, γ, ψ, µ, ν, τ ∗, τ, c, θ−i, a) ∝ φ(θτi ;µτci , ν
τ
ci
)lτ (ai | z, θτi , γ) (2.40)
p(γ | β,Σ−1, γ, ψ, µ, ν, τ ∗, τ, c, θ, a) ∝ p(γ)
N∏
i=1
lτi(ai | z, θ
τi
i , γ) (2.41)
It should be noted, however, that in some cases these Metropolis-Hastings steps may
be replaced by more direct methods with the use of an intelligently chosen prior
and/or data augmentation process. Such an example can be found in Section 2.6.1
2.6 Applications
In this section we apply our estimator to existing datasets. First, we use Andreoni
and Vesterlund (2001) to demonstrate the simple case where there is no more than
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Table 2.3.: Budgets used in the Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) experiment (their
Table I).
Budget Token endowment Hold value Pass value
1 40 1 3
2 60 1 2
3 75 1 2
4 60 1 1
5 100 1 1
6 60 2 1
7 75 2 1
8 40 3 1
one nuisance parameter per type. Secondly, we apply our estimator to Harrison et al.
(2010).
2.6.1 Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001)
Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) investigate whether men and women behave dif-
ferently in a modified dictator game. In this experiment, subjects were given a budget
of tokens, and decided how to allocate these between themselves and another person
who could not affect the outcome. Using a within-subjects design, subjects were pre-
sented with a series of these decisions, which varied in both the number of tokens,
and the value of tokens in points (worth US$0.10 each) to themselves and the other
person. In total subjects made eight decisions, with the token values and endowments
summarized in Table 2.3. For example in “Budget 1”, the decision-maker was asked
to “Divide 40 tokens: Hold at 1 point each, and Pass at 2 points each”. If
the decision-maker held all 40 tokens, she would earn 40 points and the other would
earn nothing. If she held half of the tokens, she would earn 20 points and the other
would earn 60 points. All subjects made decisions for all budgets. Pairs and roles
(decision-maker and receiver) were randomly assigned at the end and one randomly
selected budget was paid.
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Their main result is that “when altruism is expensive, women are kinder, but when
it is cheap, men are more altruistic” (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001, abstract), how-
ever we focus on their classification of subjects into types, as reported in their Table
III. The task is essentially the consumers’ problem: the decision maker (henceforth
“the self”) must decide how to allocate their endowment of tokens between themself
and another individual (henceforth “the other”). Subjects make eight such decisions
with different endowments, and importantly, different “prices”. That is, the value of
tokens to the self and the other varies. Assuming homothetic preferences, which is a
maintained assumption in Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001)’s structural analysis, the
consumer’s problem reduces to:
max
t∈[0,1]
ui(t, (1− t)/pk) (2.42)
where t is the fraction of the endowment of the tokens kept, and pk is price of increasing
the other’s income by one unit in treatment k.
In their Table III, subjects are classified using a minimum-distance estimator into
three types: Selfish subjects maximize U(πs, πo) = πs, Perfect Compliments (Leon-
tief) subjects maximize U(πs, π0) = min{πs, π0}, and Perfect Substitutes subjects
maximize U(πs, πo) = πs + πo. In the interest of adding some meaningful hetero-
geneity within these types, we introduce nuisance parameters for the weight placed
on the other’s payoff: Selfish subjects, as before, maximize USi (πs, πo) = πs; Perfect
Compliments (Leontief) subjects maximize UPC(πs, π0) = min{θPCi πs, π0}, and Per-
fect Substitutes subjects maximize UPSi (πs, πo) = πs + θ
PS
i πo.
4 We aim to estimate
the fractions of S, PS, and PC subjects in the population, and how this varies with
subject characteristics, which in this case is an indicator for sex (1 = female).
We now place some restrictions on the distribution of the nuisance parameters.
Firstly, we assume that they can only take on positive values. Secondly, identification
4While the nuisance parameter in the non-selfish types enters the utility functions on different agents’
payoffs, we choose this specification because increasing θτi results in more generous behavior for both
types.
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requires that one type cannot be parameterized by another. Without further restric-
tions, predictions of the non-selfish types approach the selfish predictions as θτi → 0.
We therefore require that the supports of the nuisance parameters do not include
values close to zero. We therefore choose the following transformation to model the
distributions of nuisance parameters:
log(θτi − δτ ) = θ̃τi ∼ Normal Mixture(ψτ , µτ , ντ ) (2.43)
That is, conditional on the component.θτi − δτ is log-normally distributed. We choose
δPC = 1/9, δPS = 1
3
, which ensures that the PC types will pass at least 10% of the
endowment when pk = 1 (more for pk < 1, less for pk > 1), and that the PS types
will pass their entire endowment in at least one treatment.
In order for our model to respect the fact that subjects’ answers may be noisy,
and are censored at whole numbers of tokens, we use the following latent choice rule:
t∗i,k = arg max
t∈[0,1]
U τii (t, (1− t)/pk; θτi ) + εi,k, εi,k ∼ N (0, γ) (2.44)
ti,k = min{max{round(wkt∗i,k, 1)/wk, 0}, 1} (2.45)
where wk is the endowment of tokens in treatment k.
5
Table 2.4 reports posterior means and standard deviations of the multinomial pro-
bit parameters, however we encourage the reader to focus on Table 2.5, which shows
the mixing probabilities by sex implied by the parameters estimated in Table 2.4. In
particular, the final row of Table 2.5 shows a hypothesis test that females are more
likely to be each type than males. For the rightmost column, we see that at all rea-
sonable levels of significance males and females are no more or less liekly to be the
selfish type; however in the non-selfish types we see statistically and economically
significant differences. Firstly, women are more likely than men to be the PC type
5In their Table IV, Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) introduce a fourth type (with nuisance param-
eters) and account for censoring at the minimum (0) and maximum (wk) number of tokens. We
account for censoring at the endpoints as well as censoring at integers.
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Table 2.5.: Posterior means (standard deviations) of mixing probabilities. The bottom
row shows the posterior probability that females are more likely to be this type than
men.
PC PS S
Male 0.3213 0.2176 0.4611
(0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0026)
Female 0.5300 0.0925 0.3775
(0.0046) (0.0017) (0.0045)
Pr[τ |f ] > Pr[τ |m] 0.9952 0.0203 0.1597
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(53.3% vs. 32.0% respectively), and women are less likely than men to be the PS type
(9.2% vs. 21.8% respectively).
We now move to analyzing our model’s fit to the experimental data. Figure 2.1
overlays Figure I from Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) with the posterior mean de-
mand predictions conditional on type.6 Panel (a) shows the prediction conditional
on being the PC type, and panel (b) shows the prediction conditional on being PS.
Solid lines show the posterior means of the estimated model, and dashed lines show
raw means from the experiment. At all prices these lines fit within their relevant 95%
Bayesian credible region (dotted lines). Figure 2.2 shows posterior mean predictions
of demand conditional on sex. For female subects (panel (a)), the raw data fall within
the 95% credible region of the structural model at all prices, for males, the model
fits within this band except when p = 1. At this point, we are able to revisit An-
dreoni and Vesterlund (2001)’s conclusion that “when altruism is expensive, women
are kinder, but when it is cheap, men are more altruistic.” We test this with our
structural model by assigning a posterior probability that the mean demand curves
shown in Figure 2.2 cross. With a posterior probability of about 92%, we interpret
this as mild support for their claim.
For the sake of exposition, in this section we introduced some unobservable het-
erogeneity in the form of nuisance parameters θPCi and θ
PS
i . One question this raises
is how much heterogeneity in preferences exists within the types, and how restrictive
the original assumption of θτi = 1 actually was. Figure 2.3 shows the posterior cumu-
lative densities of the mean and standard deviations of the nuisance parameters. The
left panel shows that the posterior means fall reasonably close to the assumed values
with high probability, indicating that on average this assumption may not be so bad.
However we cannot reject hypotheses that the means of these distributions are equal
to one.7 The right panel of Figure 2.3 shows very little probability mass close to zero,
6Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) define “demand” as the other’s monetary payoff divided by value
of the endowment to the self. In our notation, this is equal to (1− t∗i,k)/pk.
795% Bayesian credible regions of E(θPCi ) and E(θ
PS
i ) are [ 1.0679, 1.1911] and [1.1788, 1.5766]
respectively. Both do not span the originally assumed value of 1.
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Fig. 2.1. Demand for other’s income by type. Solid lines show posterior
mean predictions, and dotted lines show a 95% Bayesian credible region.
Dashed lines show the raw means of choices in the experiment. The selfish
type’s demand is omitted and falls on the vertical axis.
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Fig. 2.2. Demand for other’s income by sex. Solid lines show posterior
mean predictions, and dotted lines show a 95% Bayesian credible region.
Dashed lines show the raw means of choices in the experiment..
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Fig. 2.3. Posterior distributions (cdf) of mean and standard deviation of
the nuisance parameters.
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and we can place 95% lower bounds on the standard deviations of std[θPCi ] > 0.1507
and std[θPSi ] > 0.1907. As these lower bounds are in the order of 10% of the assumed
value, we interpret this as evidence in favor of economically significant heterogeneity:
We reject Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001)’s assumption of θτi = 1 in favor of a hetero-
geneous θτi , and reject a weaker assumption that the restriction holds in expectation.
It is important to note that our estimation restricts the non-selfish types to have
sufficiently large nuisance parameters. What the econometrician cannot distinguish
here is whether there are some (say) PC types with θPCi close to zero. These types
would be classified as selfish in our estimation. It could therefore be the case that
the true mean of θPCi is closer to zero, as here we are reporting the conditional mean
E[θτi | θτi > δτ ], rather than the unconditional mean E[θτi ].
One may question whether this significant heterogeneity in preferences propagates
into significant heterogeneity in decisions within each type. In order to shed light on













so for the “standard” dictator game parameterization of pk = 1, assuming θ
PC
i = 1
would lead to an absolute percentage error prediction in the fraction of tokens kept
by the self of roughly:
∣∣ 1
1+1
× (θPCi − 1)× 100
∣∣,8 or half the percentage error in θPCi .
We use the distribution of θPCi to estimate this prediction error at all prices studied
in this experiment. These errors are shown in Figure 2.4, which show moments of the
percentage prediction error associated with assuming the all PC types have θPCi = 1.
8We use this expression for exposition only. In Figure 2.4 we do not use this linear approximation,
and opt for the exact value instead.
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Fig. 2.4. Prediction errors associated with assuming θPCi = 1. The vertical
axis shows the estimated percentage error in predicting the fraction of
tokens kept by the self (i.e. tPC∗i,k ). The solid line shows the expected
prediction error, and the dashed lines show the 5th and 95th percentiles
of the prediction errors. That is, we estimate that 90% of individual
prediction errors will fall between the dashed lines. The solid and dashed
lines show posterior means, and the shaded regions are 95% Bayesian
credible regions.
The expected prediction error is greater than 5% at prices equal to and greater than 1
(solid line) and at the highest price studied, pk = 3, this prediction error is about 11%
on average, and between about 29% for subjects in the 95th percentile of prediction
errors.9
If the goal of an estimator is to assign a type for each subject, errors in predicted
decisions are secondary to errors in how each subject is classified. We find that while
many subjects’ nuisance parameters may vary significantly from unity, assigning sub-
jects to types based on the greatest posterior mean probability from our estimation
produces remarkably similar results to the Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001)’s mini-
9Here we report posterior means of these moments. 95% Bayesian credible regions around these are
[8.3%, 14.1%] and [21.1%, 39.7%] respectively.
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Fig. 2.5. Cumulative density of the mean posterior probability of each
subject being the type assigned by Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001)’s min-
imum distance estimator.
mum distance method. Figure 2.5 shows the empirical cumulative density function of
the probability that a subject is assigned to the same type as originally classified by
Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001). If our classification were identical to their minimum
distance method, the line would represent a degenerate distribution with a mass point
at 1 (i.e. a horizontally-mirrored “L” shape). While there are some discrepancies,
93% subjects are assigned a posterior mean probability of at least 90% being the
type that Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) assigned them. In terms of a classification
exercise, our method produces almost identical results.
Finally, while the individual nuisance parameters are not the focus of our es-
timation, we conclude our analysis of Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) by showing
shrinkage estimates of these for each subject in Figure 2.6. For the PC type, we
see that almost all subjects are classified into either (1) not PC, or (2) PC. This
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Fig. 2.6. Shrinkage estimates. The top row shows the posterior probability
of being each non-selfish type, and the bottom row shows the nuisance
parameter estimate for each non-selfish type. Error bars show a 95%
Bayesian credible region around the point estimate, which is the posterior
mean. Plots in each column are sorted by posterior mean probability of
being that type. Estimates corresponding to female subjects are denoted
with a “×” at the posterior mean.
is indicated by the very few points in the top-left panel with noticeable error bars.
Classification into either PS or not PS is less precise. In the bottom panels of this
figure we see estimates of the nuisance parameters. These become more relevant the
further to the right of the plot we go, because these are the individuals more likely to
be that type. Of interest here is that for many subjects the estimated parameter is
reasonably far away from one, although at the individual level we frequently cannot
reject that these parameters are equal to one.
2.6.2 Harrison et al. (2010)
Harrison et al. (2010) investigates discounting behavior and whether smokers dis-
count differently to non-smokers. Their experiment includes four risk aversion tasks
and six discount rate tasks. Each task was a series of Holt et al. (2002)-style binary
choices. For example, one choice in a risk aversion task was between a “Lottery A”
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that paid 2000 DKK with probability 0.7 or 1600 DKK otherwise, and a “Lottery
B” which paid 3850 DKK with probability 0.7 or 100 DKK otherwise. One choice
in each of the four risk aversion task was selected for payment. Other choices in the
risk aversion tasks varied across both probabilities and payoffs. One choice in the
a discount rate task was between a “Payment option A” which paid 3000 DKK one
month after the experiment, and a “Payment option B” which paid 3308 DKK seven
months after the experiment. Other choices in the discount rate tasks varied the time
before the first payment, and the payoffs. Subjects typically made 10 decisions in
each of the ten tasks. A full description of the experiment design and procedure can
be found in Harrison et al. (2005).
Their study asks two broad questions: Are smokers’ preferences significantly differ-
ent from non-smokers, and are smokers more or less likely to discount hyperbolically
than non-smokers. We focus on this second question, which they answer with a Har-
rison and Rutström (2009)-style mixture model. These questions are useful to policy
makers because knowing how or if smokers’ preferences and behavior differ from non-
smokers could help identify policies for encouraging smokers to quit, or discouraging
non-smokers from starting.
They consider two models of discounting: exponential and hyperbolic. Subjects












where xt is the monetary payoff at time t, δi is i’s discount rate, and ri is i’s CRRA
risk aversion parameter. The expectation is taken at t = 0. Hyperbolic discounters













where γi is i’s hyperbolic discount rate. Importantly, note that an exponential sub-
ject’s discount factor is (1+δi)
−t, and a hyperbolic’s is (1+γit)
−1. Therefore at t = 0
when deciding about payments to receive at t = 1 and 2, an exponential discounter
would never wish to revise their decision if given the opportunity at t = 1 (assum-
ing no uncertainty), but a hyperbolic subject may wish to. The hyperbolic type is
therefore considered the irrational, “behavioral” type. When trading off payments
between t = 0 and t = 1, they types make identical decisions.
Before applying our estimator to their data, we note that for small discount rates,
exponential and hyperbolic subjects make almost the same decisions.10 This is demon-
strated in Figure 2.7, where we simulate choices made by an exponential and a hy-
perbolic subject with the same risk preferences and discount rate. We shut down any
decision errors here. Each line on this plot represents a different level of risk aversion
(ri), and the horizontal axis shows the discount rate. The height of each line is the
fraction of choices that differ. Note that for small δ there is no difference between
the two types. We therefore place a restriction the hyperbolic type’s discount rate:
γi > 0.12.
We apply our estimator to their data, using Harrison et al.’s specification of utility
functions and decision error, but our specification of the nuisance parameters.11 This
is shown in Table 2.6. The first panel of this table shows the Probit parameters for
the mixing probabilities. The dependent variable in this process is an indicator for
hyperbolic discounting, therefore larger coefficients represent larger probabilities of
being hyperbolic. Here we construct the explanatory variables without a constant, so
the normal cdf of the probit parameter is directly interpretable as a mixing probability.
This transform is shown in the second panel. Both smokers are non-smokers are
10The intuition behind this is as follows: For δi = 0, both types will always choose the option that
leads to the greatest amount of money, regardless of when the payment is made. For small δi and
for the values of t studied in this experiment, (1+ δi)
−t ≈ (1+ δit)−1, and so there is little difference
between exponential and hyperbolic types’ choices.
11Another difference with our estimation is that we assume that subjects are one type or another,
but Harrison et al. (2010) assume types are determined at the decision level. We stick with the
“once one type, always that type” specification in this paper, as is used in (for example) Conte et al.
(2011). The “decisions are types” specification, as used in Harrison and Rutström (2009), could be
implemented here without any extension needed.
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Fig. 2.7. Difference between decisions made by an exponential and hyper-
bolic discounter with the same level of risk aversion.
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Table 2.6.: Mixture model estimation using data from Harrison et al. (2010), with
smoking status used as an explanatory variable for the probability of being a hyper-
bolic discounter. The remaining fraction of subjects are exponential discounters.
Mean Std dev. 95% credible region
Probit parameters
smoker -1.5503 (0.7373) [-2.7622 0.1171]
non-smoker -1.3751 (0.4866) * [-2.0126 -0.1142]
Mixing probabilities (transform of probit)
smoker 0.1095 (0.1472) *** [0.0029 0.5466]
non-smoker 0.1096 (0.1126) *** [0.0221 0.4545]
log odds ratio -0.4641 (1.0005) [-2.9249 0.9570]
Exponential type distribution
mean r 0.7124 (0.0530) *** [0.5781 0.7736]
std r 0.3830 (0.4328) *** [0.1661 1.3922]
mean log δ -2.4542 (0.1137) *** [-2.6431 -2.1709]
std log δ 2.9494 (4.5974) *** [0.7843 13.3513]
corr(r, log δ) 0.0065 (0.1528) [-0.3420 0.2682]
Hyperbolic type distribution
mean r 0.4862 (0.1946) * [0.0867 0.7841]
std r 0.8014 (0.5997) *** [0.2165 2.1774]
mean log δ -2.3327 (0.2211) *** [-2.9126 -1.9729]
std log δ 4.8273 (3.8255) *** [1.5110 13.7021]
corr(r, log δ) 0.2691 (0.3855) [-0.5756 0.9032]
Noise parameters
µ 0.0652 (0.0054) *** [0.0552 0.0744]
Error prob @ uA/uB = 1.05 0.3203 (0.0138) *** [0.2924 0.3418]
ν 0.0052 (0.0007) *** [0.0040 0.0065]
Error prob @ uA/uB = 1.05 0.0001 (0.0002) *** [0.0000 0.0005]
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estimated to by hyperbolic discounters with probability about 11%. These numbers
are much smaller than the fractions estimated by Harrison et al. (2010). However
this should not be surprising, as we do not allow subjects with discount rates below
0.12 to be classified as hyperbolic. One should therefore interpret this 11% as a lower
bound on the fraction of hyperbolic discounters, as there could be more hyperbolic
discounters present with discount rates below 0.12. Note that our credible region
for the fraction of non-smokers who are hyperbolic spans 45% of the unit interval,
while Harrison et al. (2010)’s interval spans just 18%: by this measure we can say
less about a lower bound of the mixing probability than they claim to know about the
probability itself. We then construct a 95% credible region around the log odds ratio
of these mixing probabilities. As it contains zero there is little support that smokers
are any more or less likely to be hyperbolic. Harrison et al. (2010) reach the same
conclusion.
Harrison et al. (2010) also collect information on the number of cigarettes each
participant smokes per day. In Table 2.7 we include this as an explanatory variable
for the mixing probabilities, and find similar results to Table 2.6.
Subjects’ individual probabilities of being hypobolic discounters are shown in Fig-
ure 2.8. We estimate approximately 70 subjects to be exponential with probability
very close to 1. However this is an artifact of the restriction placed on the hyperbolic
discount rate: as it is bounded away from zero, any subject with a small discount
rate is dogmatically labeled an exponential discounter. As we move further right in
this plot, subjects are more likely to hyperbolic, but the credible regions span most
of the unit interval: the experiment does not provide much information about type.12
The experiment is, however, informative about discount rate and risk aversion.
The individual-level estimates of these are shown in Figures 2.9 and 2.10 respec-
tively.13
12Performing our estimation without the lower bound on the hyperbolic discount rate produces large
credible regions for almost all of the subjects.
13As the discount rates of the two types are directly comparable for a decision involving only money
now or in one unit of time, we construct a blended discount rate. Subjects estimated more likely to
be hyperbolic receive more weight on their hyperbolic discount rate than their exponential.
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Table 2.7.: Mixture model estimation using data from Harrison et al. (2010), with
smoking status and number of cigarettes smoked per day used as explanatory vari-
ables for the probability of being a hyperbolic discounter. The remaining fraction of
subjects are exponential discounters.
Mean Std dev. 95% credible region
Probit parameters
smoker -0.1942 (1.0115) [-2.1227 1.8858]
non-smoker -1.3603 (0.4999) * [-1.9872 -0.0529]
ncigs -0.5403 (0.6897) [-2.1147 0.6538]
ncigs2 -0.0252 (0.0521) [-0.1456 0.0491]
Exponential type distribution
mean r 0.7159 (0.0524) *** [0.5783 0.7749]
std r 0.3952 (0.5013) *** [0.1657 1.5745]
mean log δ -2.4570 (0.1187) *** [-2.6433 -2.1517]
std log δ 3.4099 (5.7885) *** [0.7936 17.6935]
corr(r, log δ) -0.0063 (0.1549) [-0.3687 0.2682]
Hyperbolic type distribution
mean r 0.4667 (0.1988) * [0.0580 0.7743]
std r 0.8191 (0.6744) *** [0.2297 2.2384]
mean log δ -2.3181 (0.2033) *** [-2.8156 -1.9679]
std log δ 5.0798 (4.6735) *** [1.4891 14.3115]
corr(r, log δ) 0.2761 (0.3917) [-0.5852 0.9102]
Noise parameters
µ 0.0649 (0.0057) *** [0.0552 0.0752]
Error prob @ uA/uB = 1.05 0.3192 (0.0145) *** [0.2922 0.3432]
ν 0.0052 (0.0008) *** [0.0040 0.0066]
Error prob @ uA/uB = 1.05 0.0001 (0.0002) *** [0.0000 0.0006]
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Fig. 2.8. Posterior mean probability of subjects being the hyperbolic
type. Error bars show a 95% Bayesian credible region of this probability.
Smokers are denoted by a “◦” at the posterior mean. These estimates
correspond to the specification reported in Table 2.7. .
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Fig. 2.9. Posterior means of subjects’ discount rates. Error bars show
a 95% Bayesian credible region for this value. Smokers are denoted by a
“◦” at the posterior mean. These estimates correspond to the specification
reported in Table 2.7.
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Fig. 2.10. Posterior means of subjects’ risk aversion parameters. Error
bars show a 95% Bayesian credible region for this value. Smokers are
denoted by a “◦” at the posterior mean. These estimates correspond to
the specification reported in Table 2.7.
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2.7 Conclusion
When considering alternative models of decision-making, we are usually more in-
terested in their prevalence in our sample than the particular parameters for each
subject that enter into each model. An individual is unlikely to be made better off
by being forced to behave as if they are less risk averse than they would otherwise
choose on their own, but could be made better off by being more Bayesian or less
Prospect Theory. Estimating the prevalence of different decision rules is therefore of
great economic significance, and motivates the use of mixture models. One compli-
cation of mixture models is that econometricians must take a stand on how nuisance
parameters enter into their specification. We show that if this part of the model is
incorrectly specified, the errors can propagate through to errors in the estimates of
mixing probabilities. This can lead the researcher to falsely conclude that there are
significant fractions of both (maybe more than two) types in the population, even
when in reality only one decision rule is used.
We propose a technique that places less structure on the nuisance parameters,
but still allows for estimation of the mixing probabilities, and how they vary by
subject’s characteristics. Our estimator inherits some desirable properties of exist-
ing approaches: mixing probabilities can vary by subject characteristics (Harrison
and Rutström, 2009), nuisance parameters enter the model as random effects (Conte
et al., 2011), and we can accommodate more than two types (Andreoni and Vester-
lund, 2001). If the researcher also wishes to make statements about how nuisance
parameters vary with subject characteristics, an extension of our work could use the
θτi = Xiδ
τ + ετi specification mentioned in the literature review. We omitted this from
our analysis due to computational power issues, but the additional coding required
is minimal within the Bayesian framework. This extension could be particularly use-
ful in for example Harrison et al. (2010), if instead of mixing probabilities, we were
primarily interested in risk aversion and time preferences. In this case the mixture
model could help us make statements about these while remaining somewhat agnostic
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about the decision rule subjects use. Additionally, this could be used to either validate
or reject Harrison and Rutström (2009)’s econometric simplification that observable
characteristics uniquely determine nuisance parameters.
We analyze two experimental datasets which lend themselves to estimating a mix-
ture model. We are unable to pin down the prevalence of hyperbolic discounting in our
sample as precisely as Harrison et al. (2010) claim in their analysis. Deeper inspection
of their experiment design reveals that while the experiment is very informative about
subjects’ risk and time preferences, it provides little information about discounting
behavior. In our estimation this manifests itself as wide distributions of the posterior
mixing probabilities. Since Harrison et al. (2010) make a dogmatic assumption about
the role of unobservable nuisance parameter heterogeneity for observationally equiv-
alent subjects (i.e. there is none), their model must accommodate the data with the
limited tools at its disposal: any difference in choices of two subjects with the same
observable characteristics must be attributable to different decision rules. There is
no scope for different nuisance parameters.
We also revisit Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), and test whether their conclusion
that men and women are differently altruistic can be motivated structurally. While
our estimation casts doubt on their assumption about nuisance parameters, we find
as they do that non-selfish men and disproportionately likely to have perfect substi-
tutes preferences compared to women. This structurally supports their result that
men’s demand for altruism is more price sensitive. We also generally agree with their
classification of individual subjects into the three types.
Overall, this paper highlights some issues relevant to both experimental economists
and econometricians. The results from even a correctly specified mixture model are
only as reliable as the power of the experiment to distinguish between types. A good
experiment design will anticipate this. Even if the experiment design is good, as
econometricians we must worry about nuisance parameters: strong assumptions can
lead to false conclusions about the mixing probabilities. When a mixture model is
considered in the design phase, experimenters should think about how the experiment
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will separate types for all possible parameterizations, or at least for a plausible range
of economically significant values. When analyzing the output from a mixture model,
one should be aware of the types and their parameterizations that are distinguishable,
and aim to make statements about only those that are.
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Health insurance in the US performs two functions for consumers. The first is
the traditional function of transferring wealth from good to bad states of the world.
The other is the result of the increased bargaining power that follows from having an
insurance company act (in part) on behalf of a large number of customers. Insurers
can, and do, negotiate prices with hospitals so that, for the same services provided,
the hospital is paid less for the insured patients than it would otherwise charge an
uninsured patient. The benefit to insurers of this ex-ante negotiation is that their
costs are lower. Some of this discount may also be passed on to consumers in the
form of lower premiums.1 For hospitals, negotiation can ensure higher volumes of
admissions, because insurers can direct their customers away from hospitals that fail
to reach an agreement, typically by having a higher co-insurance rate for “out-of-
network” hospitals compared to those that are in network.
Using data from Massachusetts Center for Health Information Analysis (CHIA),
we estimate these negotiated rates from patient-level insurance claims and hospital
discharge data. We find considerable variation in the amount paid for (normalized)
services. This variation comes from three sources. (i) At any given hospital, the
payment made for services depends on the patient’s insurer. This variation can be
interpreted as insurers having different bargaining powers with the hospital. (ii) Hold-
1Once insurance companies have negotiated a lower payment. They may either rent-seek or pass
the savings on to consumers. While it is not clear which of these actions the insurance company will
take, from the point of view of social welfare, we would be interested in the latter.
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ing the insurer constant, the payment for services depends on the hospital at which
the patient was treated. We interpret this as evidence of hospitals having different
bargaining power over insurers. (iii) Considerable variation in these payments is left
over, even after controlling for the patient’s hospital and insurer. The existence of
this residual variation is testimony to the imperfectly-competitive, and imperfectly
understood nature, of health care markets.
The contribution of this paper is that we (1) calculate variation within a hospital-
insurance pair, (2) examine how this within-pair variation compares to the variation
of prices between different hospital-insurer pairs. In doing so, we contribute to the
literature studying competition in health care and insurance markets, by adding a
patient-specific level of observation whereas previous studies such as Cooper et al.
(2015) and Ho and Lee (2015) have used a hospital as the level of observation.
3.2 Literature Review
Features of hospital-insurer negotiations: Gaynor et al. (2015) outline four ele-
ments that characterize negotiation between hospitals and insurers, and the incentives
faced by insured individuals:
1. Insurers can encourage patients to go to particular hospitals over others through
differential co-insurance rates. Hospitals with which the insurer has negotiated
a favorable price have a low “in-network” rate. Hospitals with which the insurer
has not negotiated have a higher “out-of-network” rate.
2. Except for co-insurance, patients do not pay directly for their care.2
3. At the time inpatient care is needed, the patient is generally locked-in to their
insurance plan, and so cannot change plans to access the negotiated rate of
another insurance product that would (ex-post) be better to treat their illness.
2While deductibles are common in the US health insurance industry, it is not the focus of Gaynor’s
study, nor does it affect hospital-insurance negotiations as it is focused on the spitting of the payment
between insured individuals and insurance companies.
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4. Insurers negotiate with hospitals over network status (patients pay lower co-
insurance rates at in-network hospitals),and how the hospital will be compen-
sated for services. In our dataset, the reimbursement structure is mostly on a
fee-for-service basis (e.g.: the insurer pays a fraction of the amount charged by
the hospital), or a DRG basis (e.g.: the insurer pays the hospital a flat rate
determined by the patient’s diagnosis and severity of illness).
Reinhardt (2006) documents some of the features of how payments are made
between hospitals and insurers. Each hospital has a “charge master”, a list of prices
for each procedure performed in the hospital. Charges reported by the hospital are
the sum of the prices from this list of all services performed on a patient. For insured
patients, charges typically differ from the amount the hospital is compensated (by
the insurer and patient together), Compensation is based on a negotiated rate agreed
upon between the hospital and insurer. An implication of this, and the focus of
our study, is that a hospital’s compensation for a particular patient depends on the
patient’s insurer, and by extension the relative bargaining power of the hospital and
the insurer during the negotiation.
Market power: Gaynor et al. (2015) document significant and increasing concen-
tration of both hospitals and insurers. Data on insurers suggests that they are not
price-takers either when dealing with employers, or with health care providers. Dafny
(2008) provides evidence that insurers have market power over employers in that they
can extract some surplus from more profitable firms through higher premiums. If the
insurance market were competitive, premiums for the same health plan would be the
same across firms. Dafny et al. (2009) also show that premiums increase when in-
surers merge. On the provider side of insurers’ operations, they also find a decline
in physicians’ compensation and employment when insurers merge. There is also
evidence of varying negotiating power on the hospital side of the market. For exam-
ple, Ho (2008) estimates that “star” hospitals and capacity-constrained hospitals can
command markups of about 25% of revenues. Other estimated markups were much
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lower. Our analysis generally agrees with this markup: we estimate that academic
medical centers with an emergency room are compensated approximately 23% more
than community hospitals without an emergency room.
Cooper et al. (2015) use insurance claims data of individuals with private employer-
sponsored insurance to document variation in prices paid to hospitals. They estimate
prices paid for privately insured individuals that vary by a factor of three over the
Hospital Referral Regions. These prices are not strongly correlated (0.14) with similar
compensations for Medicare beneficiaries, but are associated with measures of market
power, Herfindahl indexes and counts of hospitals within a market, suggesting that
hospitals’ compensation for the privately insured is not driven by cost. Prices for
specific procedures vary by even greater factors. Our analysis complements that of
Cooper et al. (2015) by exploiting a more detailed data set, albeit only including
observations from Massachusetts.
If variation in negotiated prices is driven by varying levels of competition, then
prices should be lower in markets with more competitive hospitals. Ho and Lee
(2015) use exposure to Kaiser Permanente, a large vertically integrated insurer, as
a measure of competition in a health care market. Hospitals in more competitive
markets typically have lower prices, however attractive hospitals are able to negotiate
higher rates.
Welfare implications for insured individuals: Negotiated prices could affect
patients’ welfare for several reasons. Firstly, since insured patients typically pay a
fixed fraction of the medical bill (the co-insurance rate), a lower negotiated rate means
lower out-of-pocket expenses.This effect may be somewhat mitigated by hospitals’ re-
sponse to lower prices. Using an exogenous change in Medicare pricing, Dafny (2003)
shows that hospitals respond to lower prices by “upcoding” patients to diagnosis codes
that attract higher reimbursement, although she finds no evidence of an increase in
the intensity of care. Secondly, depending on their market power, insurers may pass
some of the savings on to consumers in the form of lower premiums. However Dafny
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et al. (2015) show that premiums are typically lower in markets with more insur-
ers. At least by this measure, it seems that the between-insurer competition effect
on premiums is stronger than any passed-through costs of higher negotiated prices in
more competitive markets.3 Ho and Lee (2015) find consolidation of insurers increases
premiums and find a heterogeneous effect on negotiated prices. Another concern for
the welfare of consumers could be through the restricted choice set imposed by an
insurer’s network. Assuming no price effect, Ho (2006) estimates a welfare loss of
about $1 billion per year in the markets studied due to restricted choice sets. As Ho
notes, this loss may be mitigated by price reductions at the hospitals remaining in
the insurer’s network. Using a natural experiment, Gruber and McKnight (2016) find
that consumers are highly price sensitive to limited-network insurance plans, and that
those who switch to them had almost 40% lower medical expenses than those who did
not. This reduction in expenditure is attributable to reductions in both demand and
price for services, especially for specialist and hospital care. They found substitution
effects in the direction of primary care.
3.3 Data Description
We use two datasets produced by the Massachusetts Center for Health Information
and Analysis (CHIA). The first of these is the All Payer Claims Database (henceforth
APCD), the set of records submitted by insurance companies to the state of Mas-
sachusetts, and provides detailed information about charges, the amount paid by the
insurance company, the patient’s out-of-pocket amount, details on deductibles. The
second is the Massachusetts Acute Hospital Case Mix Database (henceforth Case
Mix), the set of medical records submitted by the medical providers to the state.
While the data set is rich, including outpatient care, we restrict ourselves for this
3If we make the assumption that patient illnesses are spread evenly across insurance companies, then
the actuarially fair price of insurance should be constant. If this were the case, one could compare
premiums to determine measures of surplus. In a perfect world we would know both actuarially fair
prices and premiums, and look at the difference between the two.
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study to inpatient hospital services only. These inpatient records include demographic
information as well as detailed information about diagnosis, procedures, etc.
We capitalize on the rich information about payments (in APCD) and patients
(Case Mix) through an aggregated merge of the two datasets. The inpatient records
in both Case Mix and APCD are a census of hospital admissions of privately insured
patients for the state of Massachusetts. The two datasets are distributed yearly,
but since reporting periods differ overlap for nine months of the year. Therefore
we observe every admission of a privately insured patient in Massachusetts between
January and September of 2013 (inclusive). To this end, we first collapse the APCD by
patient episode (multiple line items are associated with each patient episode),4 then
use episode-specific characteristics documented in both datasets to merge the two
files. These include patient age, gender, residential zip code, hospital zip code, and at
least one of the following: diagnosis code, principal procedure code and total charges
within $1000. For the overlapping 9-month period of the two datasets, we match
approximately 65% of privately insured patients. Of the patients we do match, over
a third of them match on all three criteria (principal diagnosis, principal procedure,
and total charges within $1000), about 40% match on two criteria.
3.3.1 Some important variables
Table 1 shows summary statistics of some variables in the merged dataset. Sum-
mary statistics are calculated separately for two different payment methodologies,
Fee For Service (FFS) and Diagnosis Related Group (DRG), which are discussed in
more detail below. Of particular interest are the first three variables summarized in
this table, allowed charged and paid, which capture different ways of accounting
for hospital services.
4For example, a patient may go to the hospital and have separate charges from radiology and surgery.
These would show up as separate line items in APCD. Since we are interested in all charges associated
with a single patient episode, we sum charges from each line item for each patient episode.
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Table 3.1.: Summary statistics
(1) (2)
FFS DRG
mean sd mean sd
allowed 6902 12481 10076 12645
charged 19171 21954 20281 23210
paid 6771 11064 10810 13956
weight imp 1.126 1.124 1.369 1.484
aoverwi 6095 7456 8066 6719
poverwi 6051 7472 8992 8337
coverwi 16860 8320 15356 7684
Observations 47739 35855
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The first variable, allowed, documents the maximum amount to be paid to the
hospital for a particular illness or procedure. Specifically, the CHIA Submission Guide
instructs:
Report the maximum amount contractually allowed, and that a carrier
will pay to a provider for a particular procedure or service. This will vary
by provider contract and most often it is less than or equal to the fee
charged by the provider.
APCD Medical Claims File Submission Guide, p 38.
If patients were homogeneous, the mean of the allowed variable would represent
negotiated rates between the hospital and the insurance company.
The second variable charged is the amount the hospital charged for the services
received by a patient for a particular visit. The documentation for this variable
suggests it is independent of insurance type and payment methodology. One could
view this as the ‘sticker price’ for services, or, following the language used in Reinhardt
(2006), we could think of these as the ‘charge master’ prices. It is worth observing
that the charges are very similar between the two payment methodologies: DRG and
FFS.
The paid variable is the total amount paid to the hospital. There are, however, a
few different methodologies to determine payments, the most frequent of which is fee-
for-service. As the name suggests, charges are accrued for each service. For example,
for each x-ray the insurance company pays $150. This methodology for payments
accounts for about 40% of our inpatient records.
The next largest payment methodology in our data set is a Diagnosis Related
Group (DRG) system. DRG systems pay based on the patient illness, not on services
received. For example, a patient comes in and is admitted with pneumonia. Once
the diagnosis is determined (in this example, pneumonia), the patient is assigned to a
DRG and based on that DRG the insurance company pays the hospital a flat fee (say
$7000). This payment is invariant if the patient receives a great deal of services or a
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very few services. DRG payments account for about 35% of our data. While there are
a few other payment systems, no other single system accounts for a large fraction of
our data. As these two payment methodologies are quite different, summary statistics
are provided separately for both.
It is important to note that for some patients paid is larger than charged. At
first, this is quite counter-intuitive. Why would one pay more than one is charged for
services? However, it is precisely because of the variation in payment methodologies
that the paid to charged ratio can be greater than 1. Take a patient who is admitted
under a DRG system. This patient’s payments are determined by the DRG classi-
fication, not by the services they receive. As such, their payment may exceed their
charges, which is a function of the services they actually receive in the hospital.
As not all illnesses require the same level of service provision, a weighting system
was developed by Medicare and Medicaid. These weights, which are based on illness
classification, allow us to compare average service provision for numerous illnesses.
We had DRG illness classifications for approximately 40% of our data.
The next variable weight imp (“Imputed Weight”) is a derived variable equal
to patient’s charges relative to the casemix-adjusted average charges at the patient’s
hospital. The reason for this normalization is that we wish to attribute differences in
our estimates of negotiated rates to differences in aspects of the bargaining process,
rather than hospitals having different charge-master prices.5 We interpret this vari-
able as an aggregation of the quantity of services received, relative to the services a
patient at that hospital would receive if they had a DRG weight of 1. Therefore, a
patient with an imputed weight of 2 receives twice the services (measured in charges)
than a patient with an imputed weight of 1. It is worth noting that the average weight
of fee-for-service patients is lower than that for diagnosis related group patients. We
would interpret this to mean that our DRG patients are ‘sicker’ and require about
1.37/1.13− 1 ≈ 21% more services than out FFS patients.
5We motivate this normalization in more detail in Appendix C.1, and describe the procedure for
calculating imputed weight in Appendix C.2.
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We have also included the variables aoverwi (allowed over weight) and poverwi
(paid over weight) to be able to better compare across payment types. When we look
at an illness adjusted measure of allowable services, the two values $6,100 (for FFS)
and $8,065 (for DRGs) are far closer than when we consider the raw means $6,933
(for FFS) and $10,104 (for DRGs). Similarly, when we compare poverwi (paid over
weight), we see that the difference in payment for equally ill patients between FFS and
DRG has dropped ($6052 vs $8991), compared to their per-patient averages without
accounting for illness levels($6791 vs $10843). The goal of this paper is to understand
the ‘markdown’ of charges for normalized patients.
3.4 Results
We begin this section by testing our assumption that FFS payments are a fraction
of charges. Table 3.2 shows the result of regressing log payments against log(imputed
weight) for FFS payments, with various controls. If FFS payments are truly a frac-
tion of charges, then we would expect a coefficient of 1 on log(imputed weight) in a
Table 3.2.: OLS regressions with FFS log payments against log(charges), with various
controls. Significance stars are suppressed. The row labeled “H0: fixed markdown”
reports the p-value for the test that the coefficient on log(weigh imp) is equal to 1
(i.e., a linear relationship between payments and imputed weight).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(weight imp) 1.040 1.029 1.009 0.740 0.737 0.723
(0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0104) (0.00922) (0.00909) (0.00908)
N 47278 47278 47278 47278 47278 47278
R2 0.168 0.182 0.226 0.417 0.441 0.467
AIC 191793.2 191004.3 188456.6 175050.1 173110.9 172188.6
BIC 191810.7 191056.9 188947.4 175260.4 173794.4 178630.0
H0: fixed markdown 0 0.00600 0.364 0 0 0
Controls
EMS region - Y - - - -
Hospital - - Y - Y Y
Insurer - - - Y Y Y
Interactions - - - - - H × I
No. of controls 0 4 54 22 76 733
Standard errors in parentheses
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regression of log(payments) on log(imputed weight) and control variables.6 That is,
letting ci denote the controls used, the relationship would be:
log(paidi) = log(weighti) + ρ̃ci (3.1)
The row labeled “H0: fixed markdown” reports the p-value for this test. While we
reject the hypothesis that the coefficient is 1 for all but model (3), we note that in
models (1), (2), and (3) that the coefficients are close to one, indicating a close to
linear relationship. Looking at the coefficient on log(weight imp) in columns (4) (5)
and (6), we see some variation between 0.723 and 0.740. Given our understanding
of FFS payments, we have run the OLS regressions from columns 5 (which includes
hospital and insurer fixed effects) and have plotted the coefficients for the general
model and one in which we impose that the coefficient on log(imputed weight) is
1. These coefficient plots can be found in Appendix C.4. What we see in these
plots is that while the slope coefficients differ significantly from 1, our estimates of
negotiated rates do not vary much between these two specifications: the ranking and
approximate levels are very close.
We also investigate the relationship between (log) imputed weight and (log) pay-
ments for patients under the DRG payment systems. Table 3.3 shows the result of
regressing log(payments) against log(imputed weight) for DRG payments, with var-
ious controls. In the DRG system, the hospital is reimbursed for treating a patient
with a particular disease, and this payment is independent of the services the pa-
tient actually receives. We observe that while the coefficient on log(imputed weight)
is somewhat more consistent across the different specifications, that the predictive
power of the models is lower. This is consistent with our understanding of how reim-
bursement works for patients under a DRG system.
6If we assume charges are a linear combination of services and charge master prices, then we expect
insurance companies to pay a fixed fraction of these prices. In a log specification, then, for a 10%
increase in charges we would expect a 10% increase in payments, which is why we assert that this
coefficient should be equal to 1.
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Table 3.3.: OLS regressions with DRG log payments against log(inputed weight),
with various controls. Significance stars are suppressed. The row labeled “H0: fixed
markdown” reports the p-value for the test that the coefficient on log(weigh imp) is
equal to 1 (i.e., a linear relationship between payments and imputed weight).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(weight imp) 0.929 0.929 0.892 0.924 0.884 0.884
(0.00987) (0.00983) (0.00930) (0.00992) (0.00934) (0.00934)
N 35631 35631 35631 35631 35631 35631
R2 0.199 0.206 0.301 0.200 0.303 0.309
AIC 136066.6 135761.5 131319.7 136049.1 131259.9 131168.5
BIC 136083.6 135812.4 131794.6 136116.9 131785.7 132635.7
H0: fixed markdown 0 0 0 0 0 0
Controls
EMS region - Y - - - -
Hospital - - Y - Y Y
Insurer - - - Y Y Y
Interactions - - - - - H × I
No. of controls 0 4 54 6 60 171
Standard errors in parentheses
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Next, we investigate the explanatory power of individual hospitals and insurers,
and their interactions, in explaining the ratio of payments to charges.7 This ratio
is of interest because it represents the fraction of charges for which the hospital is
compensated. In a fee-for-service environment, this ratio provides preliminary insight
into the rate negotiated between hospitals and insurance companies. We look at a
number of specifications using different controls, and evaluate the predictive power
of different models using both frequentest and Bayesian criteria. We consider both
linear and log specifications.
Table 3.4 reports various measures of goodness-of-fit for regressions of the paid to
charge ratio against controls for emergency medical service (EMS) regions, hospitals,
and insurers. Each column restricts the sample to a single payment type. Columns
1 and 2 report results when restricting the sample to fee-for-service (FFS) payments
with linear and log specifications. Since FFS payments are typically negotiated as a
fraction of charges, we would expect these regressions to have better fit than those
with DRG payment types. Looking at Columns (3) and (4), we see the same regres-
sions (both linear and log) for DRG payments. The better fit of the FFS model is
observed in the systematically higher R2 values reported in the first two columns, cor-
responding to FFS payments. We also observe that in both FFS and DRG payment
methods, the log specification fits the data better than the linear counterpart. This
is consistent with our understanding of how the industry handles reimbursement.
The bottom two panels report the Bayesian and Akaike information criteria for
the estimated models. For FFS payments, the BIC selects Model 4, which controls
for hospitals and insurers, but without interactions.8 The AIC selects Model 7, which
includes hospital-insurer interactions. This is due to the AIC and BIC differing in the
penalty function for adding more variables. For the BIC it is k log(N), where k and
N are the number of controls and the number of observations respectively. For the
7Looking at the ratio of payments to charges is a special case of regressing log(charges) against
log(payments), in which we are forcing the coefficient on log(charges) to be 1.
8Note in Table 2 the value for Model 4 is the lowest. As the BIC is a penalty function, lower numbers
indicate better performance.
93
Table 3.4.: Regressions of the ratio of payments to charges, controlling for EMS
region, hospitals, insurers, and interactions thereof.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
poverc log poverc poverc log poverc
Mean value 0.383∗∗∗ -1.962∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ -1.129∗∗∗
(172.99) (-234.16) (212.78) (-127.90)
N 47739 47739 35855 35855
Payment type FFS FFS DRG DRG
Number of controls
1 - EMS region (E) 4 4 4 4
2 - Hospital (H) 61 61 61 61
3 - Insurer (I) 22 22 6 6
4 - H & I (uninteracted) 83 83 67 67
5 - H, I, & E (uninteracted) 85 85 68 68
6 - H & (I & E interacted) 154 154 84 84
7 - H & I (interacted) 779 779 179 179
R2
1 - EMS region (E) 0.00416 0.00682 0.00319 0.00436
2 - Hospital (H) 0.0565 0.0613 0.157 0.165
3 - Insurer (I) 0.139 0.258 0.00103 0.000808
4 - H & I (uninteracted) 0.191 0.310 0.158 0.166
5 - H, I, & E (uninteracted) 0.191 0.310 0.158 0.166
6 - H & (I & E interacted) 0.197 0.314 0.159 0.166
7 - H & I (interacted) 0.234 0.342 0.163 0.173
Bayesian information criterion
0 - Constant only 66093 193233 63456 138603
1 - EMS region (E) 65937 192950 63384 138488
2 - Hospital (H) 63974 190868 57981 132792
3 - Insurer (I) 59164 179220 63482 138637
4 - H & I (uninteracted) 56850 176394 58003 132801
5 - H, I, & E (uninteracted) 56866 176401 58012 132808
6 - H & (I & E interacted) 57286 176922 58149 132961
7 - H & I (interacted) 61786 181668 58971 133663
Model selected 4 4 2 2
Akaike information criterion
0 - Constant only 66093 193233 63456 138603
1 - EMS region (E) 65902 192915 63350 138454
2 - Hospital (H) 63438 190333 57463 132274
3 - Insurer (I) 58971 179027 63431 138586
4 - H & I (uninteracted) 56122 175666 57435 132233
5 - H, I, & E (uninteracted) 56120 175656 57435 132231
6 - H & (I & E interacted) 55934 175571 57436 132248
7 - H & I (interacted) 54951 174833 57452 132144
Model selected 7 7 4 7
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
94
AIC the penalty is 2k. As N is relatively large in our sample, these two criteria place
greatly different weight on the number of controls. We interpret these selections as
hospitals and insurers having varying bargaining power, which is supported by both
criteria. We interpret the AIC’s selection as hospital-insurance pairs being the level
of observation that best explains the variation in price.
For DRG payments, the BIC selects Model 2, which controls for hospitals. The
AIC selects Model 4 with a linear specification for the ratio of payments to charges,
which includes all hospitals and insurance companies without interactions. The AIC
selects Model 7 in the log specification, which includes all interactions. We now
turn our attention to understanding the variation in negotiated rates at the hospital-
insurance level.
3.4.1 Estimates of negotiated rates for FFS payments
In this section, we estimate negotiated rates for FFS payments, and document
the variation in rates across hospitals and insurers. We investigate negotiated rates
using payments per imputed weight as the relevant metric. Figures 3.1 and 3.2
show coefficient plots from a regression of the (log) paid per imputed weight ratio
against indicators for hospitals and insurers respectively, suppressing the constant
term. Differences in these coefficients represent fractional negotiated rate differences.
That is, if hospital A has a coefficient of 8.5, and hospital B has a coefficient of 9.0,
then hospital B’s negotiated rates are estimated to be on average exp(9.8−8.5) ≈ 1.65
times greater than hospital B’s. These figures document much variation in mean
compensation per weight by both hospital and insurer. For hospitals (Figure 3.1) we
see variation in negotiated rates by a factor of approximately exp(10.4 − 8.4) ≈ 7.4
(comparing New England Baptist to Anna Jacques). For insurers (Figure 3.2) Blue
Cross negotiates rates that are on average approximately one tenth (exp(−2.4− 0) ≈
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Fig. 3.1. Coefficients on hospital indicators estimated from regressing
log(payment per imputed weight) against indicators for hospitals and in-
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Fig. 3.2. Coefficients on insurer indicators estimated from regressing
log(Payment per imputed weight) against indicators for hospitals and in-
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Fig. 3.3. Estimates of negotiated rates for the largest hospital-insurer
pairs. Market shares are shown in parentheses (fraction of FFS admis-
sions). The full list of negotiated rates is shown in Appendix C.3.
Appendix C.3 shows estimates of payments per imputed weight for each hospital-
insurer pair with at least 30 admissions. We show these estimates for the three
largest insurers in Figure 3.3. Each value in this table reports the mean payment
made by an insurer for an imputed weight of 1, which we construct to be equivalent
to a DRG weight of 1. Column (7) of this table highlights great variation between
hospitals. For example, Berkshire Medical Center on average receives about $10,150
per imputed weight for insured individuals. This value is one of the highest in column
(7), and reflects this hospital’s geographic isolation: there are few substitute hospitals,
so insurers are less able to direct patients living in that area elsewhere. Overall,
Figure 3.3 shows that there is much more variation in compensation across insurers
than across hospitals.
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Fig. 3.4. Payment per imputed weight at Massachusetts General Hospital.
3.4.2 Within-pair variation
While previous literature has looked at hospitals as the level of observation, the
patient-level data used here allows us to examine the variation within a hospital-
insurer pair. In order to better understand the variation of the amount paid by both
the hospital and insurance company in relation to the amount charged by the hospital,
we look at the ratio of the total paid to imputed weight for each patient at a particular
hospital with a particular type of insurance. Figure 3.4 shows boxplots of the ratio of
payments to imputed weights for FFS payments at Massachusetts General Hospital
(the largest hospital by number of FFS payments). While this figure illustrates that
there is great variation in median payments for an imputed weight by insurer, there
is much left to be explained. We consider the interquartile ranges shown in this figure
to be economically significant, and wish to further understand this variation.
Table 3.5 investigates possible drivers of this variation by regressing the log ratio
of payments per imputed weight against log negotiated rates and some patient char-
acteristics. Column 1 shows the constant-only model, and column 2 introduces the
99
Table 3.5.: Regression of log payment per imputed weight against log negotiated
rates estimates and patient characteristics. Column 5 restricts the dataset to only
use observations that have no omitted values for the regression in Column 4.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log poverwi log poverwi log poverwi log poverwi log poverwi
log(negotiated rate) 1.609∗∗∗ 1.593∗∗∗ 1.397∗∗∗ 1.471∗∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0136) (0.0242) (0.0227)
female 0.198∗∗∗ 0.0331 0.0350
(0.0187) (0.0250) (0.0251)
5-18 years -0.603∗∗∗ -0.575∗∗∗ -0.568∗∗∗
(0.0528) (0.0840) (0.0842)
17-24 years -0.428∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗ -0.366∗∗∗
(0.0497) (0.0750) (0.0751)
24-44 years -0.192∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗
(0.0372) (0.0540) (0.0539)
44-64 years -0.409∗∗∗ -0.485∗∗∗ -0.439∗∗∗
(0.0364) (0.0528) (0.0526)
over 64 years -0.651∗∗∗ -0.671∗∗∗ -0.694∗∗∗
(0.0390) (0.0658) (0.0521)
Other Non-Federal Programs -1.745∗∗∗
(0.425)
Preferred Provider organization 0.922∗∗∗
(0.0871)
Point of Service 0.731∗∗∗
(0.0856)




Health Mainienance Organization 0.712∗∗∗
(0.0942)
Constant 7.676∗∗∗ -6.047∗∗∗ -6.192∗∗∗ -4.940∗∗∗ -4.779∗∗∗
(0.0109) (0.115) (0.615) (0.717) (0.717)
Observations 30206 30206 30206 12396 12396
R2 0.000 0.323 0.339 0.329 0.320
AIC 124580.6 112789.6 112144.7 41894.8 42054.3
BIC 124588.9 112806.2 112535.5 42288.3 42403.3
Race and ethnicity controls? Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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log(negotiated rate) term. The R2 suggests that negotiated rates account for about
32% of the variation in this ratio. Within the merged dataset we have two candidates
for explaining at least some of the remaining 68%. Column 3 introduces patient de-
mographics: age, sex, race, and ethnicity. including these characteristics improves
slightly on the Column 2 regression. Of particular interest here is the positive and
significant coefficient on the female indicator variable, suggesting that insurers com-
pensate hospitals on average approximately 20% more than men for the same imputed
weight. This is explored further in Column 1 of Table 3.6, which interacts sex with
age categories. Here the effect goes away for all groups except for women aged be-
tween 17 and 44 years.9 It may be that insurers negotiate differently for maternity
care than for other services. However these demographic characteristics on their own
account for very little variation in the paid to imputed weight ratio. In Column (2)
we use only these demographics as explanatory variables, and achieve account for
only 5.2% of the variation.
Another possibility is that insurers negotiate with hospitals for each of their plans,
not for all of their customers together. If this was the case, then further slicing of
the data by plans should provide more predictive power for payments. In the APCD
we observe a variable categorizing the type of insurance plan a patient has. We
use these as additional explanatory variables in Column 4 of Table 3.5. These buy
marginally more explanatory power than controlling for patient demographics alone.
Together, we interpret Tables 3.5 and 3.6 as suggestive evidence that a large fraction
of hospitals’ compensation of insured patients is explained by negotiated rates at the
hospital-insurer level, but there still remains a large fraction of unexplained variation.
Some of this variation may be the result of hospitals and insurers negotiating a fraction
of charges for most services, but then negotiating other rates for some specific services,
such as those provided in a maternity ward, or in a specialized care unit.
9Approximately 30% of women admitted in this age range are admitted for maternity care.
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Table 3.6.: Regression of log payment per imputed weight against log negotiated rates
estimates and patient characteristics.
(1) (2)





5-18 years -0.639∗∗∗ -0.876∗∗∗
(0.0742) (0.0892)
17-24 years -0.800∗∗∗ -0.977∗∗∗
(0.0770) (0.0926)
24-44 years -0.663∗∗∗ -0.902∗∗∗
(0.0564) (0.0678)
44-64 years -0.450∗∗∗ -0.424∗∗∗
(0.0490) (0.0590)
over 64 years -0.688∗∗∗ -0.553∗∗∗
(0.0533) (0.0641)
female=1 × 5-18 years 0.0840 0.0726
(0.105) (0.126)
female=1 × 17-24 years 0.632∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.121)
female=1 × 24-44 years 0.707∗∗∗ 1.262∗∗∗
(0.0748) (0.0898)
female=1 × 44-64 years 0.0936 0.157
(0.0697) (0.0838)








Race and ethnicity controls? Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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3.5 Conclusion
Hospitals and insurers both have significant market power in the market for health
care. Exploiting that they can influence their customers’ hospital choices, insurers
negotiate lower prices for services. In return, hospitals are able to boost their admis-
sions from that insurer. The resulting negotiated rates mean that the price paid for
the same services at the same hospital varies by insurer.
This paper estimates these negotiated rates, and documents the variation in ne-
gotiated rates between hospitals and insurance companies. We look at this variation
within hospital-insurer pairs, with a single hospital and many insurers, with a single
insurer and many hospitals and across the state of Massachusetts. We find great vari-
ation in amounts paid for services across these three dimensions. Negotiated rates
appear to vary more by insurer than by hospital, suggesting that insurers’ bargaining
power is more heterogeneous than hospitals’. Our analysis shows that using charges
as a proxy for insured patients’ out-of-pocket expenses (i.e. co-insurance) may be
inaccurate if the sample includes more than one insurer.
This paper builds on existing studies with the use of the Massachusetts CHIA
APCD and Case Mix datasets. These allow us to analyze payments at the patient
level, with rich information about both illnesses and transactions. While negotiated
rates organize our data well, there remain unexplained differences in payments within
a hospital-insurer pair: within any hospital-insurer pair making FFS payments, the
relationship between payments and charges is not deterministic. Given our under-
standing of FFS payment arrangements, we conclude that negotiations happen over
finer measures of service than simply a fraction of charges. Possible candidates could
be (i) the most extreme case of negotiating prices for each and every service the hospi-
tal offers (e.g. minutes in the operating room, nights stayed, etc.), and (ii) negotiating
differential prices over types of service, for example patients in the maternity ward
could face different negotiated rates to patients in the emergency room. Controlling
for patient demographics suggests that at least the latter explanation is plausible.
103
Further work in this area could approach this bargaining problem from a more
theoretical angle. In this paper we discuss negotiation while remaining agnostic as to
the bargaining game underlying the process. Our estimates of negotiated rates could
be used, along with estimated models of hospital demand, to structurally estimate
parameters in bargaining games. Such analysis would be useful in analyzing counter-
factual claims about the market for health insurance. As both sides of the market are
large, hospitals merging may increase prices, and insurers merging may lower prices.
The magnitude of these changes could be predicted with such a model. Additionally,
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A. APPENDIX FOR: HOW MANY GAMES ARE WE
PLAYING? AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF
CHOICE BRACKETING IN GAMES
A.1 Equilibrium analysis
Consider the two games in Table A.1. Games Γ1 and Γ2, in isolation, are both
2-player Volunteer’s Dilemmas (Diekmann, 1985, 1986). In Γ1, choosing action A
guarantees earnings of a, while choosing B yields earnings of x iff the other player
does not choose A. Similar incentives exist in Γ2. As earnings are additive across
the two tables, a (mixed) strategy is a probability distribution over all four possible
combinations of actions {A,B} × {C,D}, and assuming broad bracketing, standard
game theory would treat this game no differently to the 4-action, 2-player game
presented in Table A.2.
For the remainder of this paper, I use pij to denote the joint probability of taking
action i in Γ1 and j in Γ2, and pk to denote the unconditional probability of taking
Table A.1.: The Roommate’s Dilemma. Players chose a pair of actions
{AC,AD,BC,BD}, payoffs are the sum of outcomes in both tables. x > a > 0,
y > c > 0, a < c.
Γ1
A B
A a, a a, x
B x, a 0, 0
Γ2
C D
C c, c c, y
D y, c 0, 0
Table A.2.: Broad-bracketed version of Γ1.
AC AD BC BD
AC a+ c, a+ c a+ c, a+ y a+ c, x+ c a+ c, x+ y
AD a+ y, a+ c a, a a+ y, x+ c a, x
BC x+ c, a+ c x+ c, a+ y c, c c, y
BD x+ y, a+ c x, a y, c 0, 0
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Table A.3.: Characterization of equilibria based on unpaired choice probabilities in
bracketed games.
Player 1 Player 2
pA pC pA pC
Pure actions only 1 0 0 1 1
2 0 1 1 0
3 1 0 0 1
4 1 1 0 0
One pure, one mixed 5 a/x 0 a/x 1
6 a/x 1 a/x 0
7 0 c/y 1 c/y
8 1 c/y 0 c/y
Both mixed 9 a/x c/y a/x c/y
action k in its relevant game (i.e. pA = pAC + pAD). When discussing asymmetric
equilibria, I use superscripts to denote player labels.
A.1.1 Risk-neutral equilibria of the broad-bracketed game
Note that there are 3 Nash equilibria in each bracketed game, and therefore in the
broad-bracketed game there are 3×3 = 9 types of equilibria, based on whether players
mix in zero, one, or both bracketed games. These are summarized in Table A.3.
Note that apart from the equilibria where players mix in both games, these uniquely
categorize the equilibrium. For example, for the equilibrium described in row 5,
players mix in game 1 and don’t mix in game 2, so it must be that:
p1AD = a/x, p
1
BD = 1− a/x
p2AC = a/x, p
2
BC = 1− a/x
and all other actions are played with zero probability. However, for the final case (case
9 in Table A.3) where both players mix in both games, a continuum of equilibria exist.
First I characterize the set of strategies that make players indifferent between
taking all four action pairs. Note that since playing AC always yields a payoff of
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a + c, any fully mixed strategy equilibrium must achieve this payoff. Therefore we
can characterize any such MSNE as a pair1 of p∗ satisfying:
1 1 1 1
a+ c a+ c a+ c a+ c
a+ y a a+ y a
c+ x c+ x c c












pAC − pBD =
a y + c x− x y
x y
(A.2)
pAD + pBD = 1− c/y (A.3)
pBC + pBD = 1− a/x (A.4)
Note that (A.3) and (A.4) are the MSNE probabilities of each bracketed game. Ex-









a/x+ c/y − 1 + 1− c/y − pAD
pAD
1− a/x− (1− c/y − pAD)





c/y − a/x+ pAD
1− c/y − pAD
 (A.5)
Next I focus on strategies that exclude exactly one action pair. These strategies
must be nested within (A.5). Specifically, the strategy must still make his opponent’s
expected payoff from the bracketed games equal to a and c respectively, and hence
a+ c in the full game. Otherwise she has a pure-strategy best response, and therefore
the column player must not be willing to mix. Therefore any mixed strategy Nash
1As there are many solutions to (A.1), all of which make opponents indifferent between the four
action pairs, it suffices that strategies are played that satisfy this equation, and it is not necessary
that both players use the same strategy.
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equilibrium strategy that puts positive probability on exactly three action pairs must
also satisfy (A.5).
If an equilibrium strategy puts positive probability on only two action pairs, then
it must be that these action pairs correspond to a pure strategy in one bracketed
game, and the mixed strategy in the other. First, note that the equilibria described
above are the same as types 5-8 in Table A.3. To see that we cannot have other
equilibria of this type, suppose that the column player sets pAD = pBC = 0, so only
ever plays actions AC and BD. This fixes the probability that column plays A to
the same value as the probability she plays C, which means that row’s best response
involves playing a pure strategy in at least one of the bracketed games. If column
best responded to this, she would not be willing to play here candidate strategy. This
argument also rules out strategies setting pBC = pAD = 0.
A.1.2 Some possibly salient equilibria
Payoff and risk dominance Harsanyi and Selten (1988) identify payoff and risk
dominance as arguments for selecting among multiple equilibria. As the Roommate’s
Dilemma is an anti-coordination game, however, these do dot have much bite. Payoff
dominance suggests that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium will be selected. With
random matching in the experiment design, however, it is unlikely that subjects will
successfully coordinate on pure strategies. Risk dominance suggests favor for actions








respectively, but players could not all take these actions
in equilibrium.
Symmetry Another appealing selection criterion is symmetry, which suggests that
both players’ choice probabilities are the same.2 This rules out all pure-strategy Nash
equilibria and all mixed strategy Nash equilibria except for those where both players
2This selection criterion has been used extensively in directed search games, which include an anti-
coordination game in the second stage. See for example Julien et al. (2000); Burdett et al. (2001)
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choose according to (A.5), parameterized by the same pAD. Symmetry has appeal in
this setting due to the random matching in the experiment design.
Independence One could further restrict the symmetric equilibria to the equilib-
rium where actions are independent across the bracketed games. The choice proba-


























which is a special case of (A.5). Note that this equilibrium places positive weight on
the SOSD action AD.
Exclusion of SOSD actions If players are broad bracketers and have only a very













Inequality Chmura et al. (2005) and ? demonstrate that inequality can matter in
coordination games, and therefore equilibria may be selected that result in a more eq-
uitable distribution of earnings. This would suggest that the (AD,BC) and (BC,AD)
equilibria (i.e. where each player takes one “safe” action and one “risky” action) may
be more likely to be selected over equilibria where one player takes both safe actions,
and hence earns much less than their opponent.
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A.1.3 Narrow bracketing, second-order stochastic dominance, and back-
ground risk
Until this point, I have restricted attention to predictions made by assuming
risk neutrality. I now change focus and investigate the implications of risk averse
preferences in the game. Specifically, I identify the action pairs that can be ruled out
by second-order stochastic dominance:




F (w)−G(w)dw ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ R
and there exists an x ∈ R such that the above inequality is strict.
Given the choice between lotteries, no risk-averse individual would choose one that
was SOSD by another.
Figure A.1 shows the cumulative density functions of the lotteries induced by the
four action pairs. Using the restrictions:
a < c, a < x, c < y (A.6)
which will be maintained in all treatments, then one can derive the conditions on
subjective beliefs (pA, pB) such that one SOSD another by checking that the difference
in the integrals up to x+ y is at most zero.
Theorem A.1.1 Given subjective beliefs (pA, pB) :
1. AX SOSD BX ∀X ∈ {C,D} iff pA ≤ ax

































0 x y x+ y
pBD
pBD + pAD









i = x(pBD + pBC) + y(pBD + pAD)
= x(1− pA) + y(1− pC)
Fig. A.1. Cumulative density function for the four action pairs (not to
scale).
∫ x+y
−∞ F (w)dw is shown below each plot, which is used to calculate



























Fig. A.2. Actions permissible by risk-averse individuals. In the shaded
region, a narrow-bracketing individual may choose AD mistakingly. All
boundaries intersect at the risk-neutral mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Shown for parameterizations satisfying a+ x < c+ y.









4. AC SOSD BD iff pC ≤ a+c−pAxy
Note that inequalities 1, 2, and 4 bind at the risk-neutral mixed-strategy Nash equi-
librium (p∗A, p
∗
B) = (a/x, c/y). Therefore if risk-averse players were playing against a
risk-neutral Nash equilibrium strategy, AC is their unique best response. Inequality
3 binds in the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium iff a+ x ≤ c+ y.
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While not directly expressed in the payoff tables, transferring earnings between Γ1
and Γ2, or simply adding or subtracting earnings from one table affects play differently
depending on the assumptions made about bracketing.
Theorem A.1.2 Hold a player’s beliefs about opponents’ strategies constant. If a
subject has decreasing absolute risk aversion, then:
1. Subtracting z > 0 from all payoffs in Γ1 and adding z to all payoffs in Γ2 (i)
will not affect the player’s decisions if she broadly brackets (κ = 1), and (ii) will
make a narrow bracketer (κ < 1) more likely to take action A holding their C/D
choice constant, and more likely to take action D (holding their A/B choice
constant).
2. Subtracting z > 0 from Γ1 (i) will make the player more likely to choose A
(holding their C/D choice constant) irrespective of their bracketing behavior,
(ii) iff the player is not a narrow bracketer (κ = 0) will make them more likely
to choose C (holding their A/B) choice constant.
These results follow directly from Eeckhoudt et al. (1996, See their Proposition 1,
p685). Transferring earnings from one table to another does not affect broad brack-
eters because they always “see” the payoffs as in Table A.2. Changing the earnings
of one game while leaving the other unchanged does not change narrow bracketers’
behavior in the unchanged game because they ignore these changes when making
their decision in this game.
A.1.4 Risk aversepredictions
Here I state some results, derived in Appendix A.2, that may be used to distinguish
narrow and broad bracketing play in equilibrium in the Roommate’s Dilemma, and
for behavior in the Lottery Task:
Theorem A.1.3 The utility (and hence certainty equivalent) of any non-degenerate
gamble is strictly decreasing in bracketing parameter κ (see Equation 1.1).
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Theorem A.1.4 Any risk-averse player who does not fully narrow bracket (i.e. κ > 0
in (1.1)) cannot be made indifferent between taking all four actions.
It follows from this that the only way a risk-averse player can appear to be indifferent
between all four actions is if she narrowly brackets (κ = 0).
Theorem A.1.5 Hold DARA risk preferences constant. The tokens invested in Part
2 of the Lottery Task is increasing in κ (see Equation 1.1).
A.2 Proofs
Proof of Theorem A.1.1
Proof 1. Since gambleX is a common element of both AX and BX, it is sufficient





= (x+ y − a)− [x(1− pA) + y]




2. Since gamble X is a common element of both XC and XD, it is sufficient to





= (x+ y − c)− [y(1− pC) + x]











= x(1− pA) + y − c− [y(1− pC) + x− a]




for the case where c + x > a + y, the cdfs cross twice. First at c, and again at





= −(c− a)(1− pC) + (pC − pA)(a+ y − c)
= −c+ a− pA(a− c+ y) + pCy
⇐⇒ pC ≤
c− a+ pA(a− c+ y)
y





= x+ y − a− c− [x(1− pA) + y(1− pC)]




Proof of Theorem A.1.3
Proof Let Z be a multivariate random variable with distribution function F (z) and
marginals Li(zi). The monetary payoff from realization z is
∑
i zi. If an agent with
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utility specified in (1.1), and brackets according to each element of X, then they have

































where the inequality follows by concavity of u. As utility is decreasing in κ, it must
be that the certainty equivalent is decreasing in κ for all non-degenerate, bracketed
gambles.
Proof of Theorem A.1.4
Proof Suppose to the contrary that the player is made indifferent between taking
all four actions. Because the player is risk-averse and AC yields certain earnings of
a+ c, it follows that actions AD, BC, and BD must yield a higher monetary payoff









with all δs strictly positive. The risk-averse MSNE probabilities pr must therefore be
characterized by the system of equations:

a+ c a+ c a+ c a+ c a+ c
a+ y a a+ y a a+ c+ δ1
c+ x c+ x c c a+ c+ δ2




1 1 1 1 1
y − c −c y − c −c δ1
x− a x− a −a −a δ2








1 1 1 1 1
0 −y 0 −y δ1 − y + c
0 0 −x −x δ2 − x+ a
0 −y −x −x− y δ3 − x− y + a+ c

−(y − c)× [1]
−(x− a)× [1]
−(y + x− a− c)× [1]
∼

1 1 1 1 1
0 −y 0 −y δ1 − y + c
0 0 −x −x δ2 − x+ a





1 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1

−[4]÷ δ3
([2]− [4]× (δ1 − y + c)/δ3)÷ (−x)




1 0 0 −1 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1

−[2]− [3]
Note that the last row of this matrix is equivalent to 0′p = 1, but p ∈ ∆3, a
contradiction,3 and so at most one action must be played with zero probability in
equilibrium.
3This does not work for the risk-neutral case because all of the δs are equal to zero and we must
divide by δ3
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Proof of Theorem A.1.5
Proof Fix the amount for the blue investment at xB and consider the restricted
problem of choosing only xR with xB fixed. A broad bracketer notices that the B in-
vestment is background risk for the problem of choosing xR, and that this background
risk is a sure payment of 1− xB, plus 50% chance of winning χxB, which first-order
stochastically dominates receiving nothing for sure, and independent of the lottery
induced by her choice of xR. Therefore by Eeckhoudt et al. (1996, p685, Theorem
1), the broad bracketing subject behaves uniformly less risk-averse by noticing this
background risk that a narrow bracketer would ignore. The broad bracketer’s choice
of xR conditional on xB is hence higher than that of the narrow bracketer.
The above reasoning has established that x∗(κ = 0) < x∗(κ = 1). It remains to
show that x∗ is monotonic is κ. To see this, note that we can write a κ-bracketer’s
utility as:
Uκ(x) = κU
B(x) + (1− κ)UN(x)
where the B and N superscripts denote the narrow and broad bracketing extremes.
As UB and UN are globally concave, it follows that x∗(κ) ∈ [x∗(0), x∗(1)], and by
induction for κ′ < κ′′ that x∗(κ′) ∈ [x∗(0), x∗(κ′′)]. x∗ must therefore be increasing in
κ.
A.3 Notes on Bayesian estimations
A.3.1 Prior distributions
Population parameters (β,Σ, λRD, λLT ) require specification of priors. These are
discussed below.
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I use a normal-inverse Wishart prior β and Σ. For β, I set the mean of the
first row (i.e. the constant term) equal to reasonable expected values for the relevant





log(0.5)− 0.5 log(0.5)− 0.5 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
...
...
0 0 0 0 0
 (A.7)
and set the prior variance of each element of β to 1. This achieves prior means of
0.5 for the risk aversion parameters, and uniform priors on γi and the probability of
bracketing in each task.




i , γi)), I
assume:
Σ−1−κ ∼Wishart(5, 5I3) (A.8)
Where I is the identity matrix.
For the lower-right block of Σ, which I denote Σκ, there is one unrestricted pa-
rameter, ω, which is the covariance of the two latent type processes. I assume:
ω ∼ U [−1, 1] (A.9)
Finally, I assume log-normal priors for the logit precision parameters:
log(λRD) ∼ N (−3, 1) (A.10)
log(λLT ) ∼ N (−4, 2) (A.11)
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A.3.2 Likelihood function
This section derives the likelihood function and describes the data augmentation
process used to simulate the likelihood.4
Let Y denote the data obtained from the experiment. This contains all choices
made by all subjects in both the Roommate’s Dilemma, and the Lottery Task. Subject
i’s action in period t of the Roommate’s Dilemma is ai,t, and their decision in instance






















{ai,t}20t=1 ∪ {bi,s}8s=1 ∪ {rRDi , rLTi , κRDi , κLTi , γi}
}
(A.13)
In the remainder of this section, I first derive the likelihood functions conditional on
the augmented data Y ∗ and the model parameters θ, where:
θ ≡ (λRD, λLT , µRDr , νRDr , µLTr , νLTr , ρRD, ρLT , µγ, νγ) (A.14)
I then derive the joint posterior distribution of the parameters and latent variables.
Finally, I outline the procedure for drawing from this distribution.
Roommate’s Dilemma likelihood function: With the logistic choice rule, if
action a yields utility U(a), then it will be played with probability proportional




i , γi) and opponents’ previous actions
{aj,τ}j∈Gi,τ<t (G contains the list of subjects in i’s group) completely determine ex-
4For an outline of data augmentation, see van Dyk and Meng (2001).
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pected utility, we can write the likelihood of observing sequence {ai,t}20t=1, conditional
on the individual-specific parameters, in the Roommate’s Dilemma as:
pRDi (Y
∗







λRDU(ai,t; {aj,τ}j∈Gi,τ<t, rRDi , κRDi , γi)
]∑
a exp [λRDU(a; {aj,τ}j∈Gi,τ<t, rRDi , κRDi , γi)]
]
p(Zi | θ) (A.16)
where expected utilities U(·) are calculated using CRRA parameter rRDi , bracketing
parameter κRDi and beliefs parameter γi. Note that, conditional on the individual-
specific parameters, none of the parameters governing the distribution of these enter
the above equation.
Lottery Task likelihood function: as with choices in the Roommate’s Dilemma,
the probability of observing choices {bi,s} in the Lottery Task, conditional on all
parameters including the individual-specific parameters, is:
pLTi (Y
∗



















p(Zi | θ) (A.18)
where Vs(b; ·) is the expected utility of taking action b in instance s of the lottery
task. As the choice set is large for the lottery task (101 and 1012 for parts 1 and 2
respectively), I use two approximations of this function: Firstly, in the second part
where subjects make a decision for both the red lottery and the blue lottery, I take
the mean of the two decisions and calculate the expected utility as if they made this
mean choice in both lotteries. Secondly, I linearly interpolate (A.18) over 21 evenly
spaced grid points so that the numerator need only be evaluated at multiples of 5.
Note that at any two grid points, the probability ratio property of logit choice is
preserved.
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Simulation of the posterior distribution








i , γi) be the latent, subject-specific variables in the
model, and Y ∗ = Y ∪ L∗. I use the following result to derive the joint posterior
distribution of (θ, Z), up to a normalizing constant:







i | θ)pLTi (Y ∗i | θ)p(Zi | θ)
]
p(λRD)p(λLT )p(β,Σ) (A.20)
where (A.19) applies Bayes’ theorem, and (A.20) substitutes in expressions of the
likelihood (p(Y ∗ | θ), given by (A.16) and (A.18)) and the prior (p(θ)). Note that
the term p(Zi | θ) appears only once in (A.20), but it appears both in (A.16) and
(A.18). This is because the variable Zi is common to both the Roommate’s Dilemma
and the Lottery Task. The product term in (A.20) follows because of the maintained
assumption of independence between subjects. I leave (A.20) with all hyperparame-
ters governing the distribution of individual parameters lumped into the same prior
p(β,Σ). While some estimations assume no dependence between an individual’s pa-
rameters, I derive the general case here where there may be dependence.
Conditional distributions of latent parameters (rRDi , r
LT
i , γi): All latent vari-
ables take on non-standard posterior distributions. I therefore use the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm to draw each parameter. This algorithm requires only that the
distribution function is known up to a constant of proportionality. Note from (A.20)
that this is exactly what we have.
For the step to simulate zi ∈ {rRDi , rLTi , γi}, we require the distribution, up to
proportionality, of:
zi | Y, Z−zi , θ
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where “Z−zi” denotes all elements of Z except for zi. Inspection of (A.20) reveals
that no element of θ appears in this, and so p(zi | Y, (Z − zi)) is proportional to the
element of the likelihood function specific to individual i, that is:
p(zi | Y, (Z − zi), θ) ∝ pRDi (Y ∗i | θ)pLTi (Y ∗i | θ)p(Zi | θ) (A.21)
For each zi, a proposal z
′
i is drawn from density q(z
′
i | zi) satisfying q(z′i | zi) = q(zi |









where u ∼ U [0, 1].5
Conditional distributions of latent parameters (κRDi , κ
LT
i ): Unlike the other
latent parameters, the conditional distributions of the bracketing parameters can be
derived. (A.21) still applies, but further simplification can be gained by noting that



















for W ∈ {RD,LT}
Conditional distribution of logit choice precision parameters (λRD, λLT ):
Noting that each λ only appears in the likelihood specific to its task, and its prior,
5For all variables I use a normal density with mean zi and variance tailored to each parameter.
In practice, I determine the inequality in (A.22) using logs because the likelihood functions are all
calculated on a log scale, so it is computationally more convenient to log u rather than exponentiate
the likelihoods.
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the conditional posterior distribution for each logit precision parameter is proportional
to:




∗ | θ), for W ∈ {RD,LT} (A.24)
As this does not conform to a known distribution, I use Metropolis-Hastings steps to
draw each λ.
Conditional distributions of (µr, νr, µγ, νγ): Both ri (from each task) and Φ
−1(γi)
are assumed to be independent draws from normal distributions. Inspection of (A.20)
shows that conditional on the individual parameters, the posteriors of these hyper-
parameters are conjugate. That is:
p(µr, νr | Y ∗, θ−(µr,νr)) ∝
∏
i
p(Zi | θ)p(β,Σ) (A.25)
It follows that:
µr | Y ∗, θ−µr ∼ N
[∑
i ri/νr + E(µr)/V (µr)
(N/νr + V (µr)−1)−1











where underlines denote prior parameters. The same applies for (µγ, νγ).
Conditional distribution of ρ: Inspection of (A.20) shows that conditional on the
individual parameters, the posterior density of ρ (for each task W ) is proportional to:
p(ρW | θ−ρW , Y ∗) ∝
∏
i











i (1− ρW )
∑
i(1−κWi I(ρW ∈ [0, 1]) (A.30)
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where (A.29) substitutes in the uniform prior on ρW . (A.30) is the Beta kernel,
therefore:









A.3.3 Augmented posterior distribution








i ) be the latent, subject-specific variables in the











, W ∈ {RD,LT} (A.32)
As in (A.20) I use the following result to derive the joint posterior distribution of
(θ, L∗), up to a normalizing constant:







i | θ)pLTi (Y ∗i | θ)
]











i − 1) ≥ 0
)
Comparing (A.20) and (A.34) reveals many similarities: firstly, the logit choice
precision parameters λRD and λLT appear in exactly the same way. Therefore the
process for drawing these from their conditional posteriors is exactly the same; sec-
ondly, the latent variables Z∗ appear enter into both equations in the same way, so
drawing these will be identical, although one must now update the unconditional
means, say µr, to account for the dependence between these parameter. One impor-
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tant difference is the final line of (A.34). This keeps track of the mapping between
κ∗i and κi.
The remainder of this section outlines the process for simulating the distribution
in (A.34). This is achieved using a Gibbs sampler, a Markov chain Monte Carlo
technique which requires that the conditional distributions of all variables can be
simulated. I omit the derivation of the conditional posteriors when they are unchanged
from the previous section.
Conditional distributions of κWi and κ
∗W
i These parameters are linked in that
the sign of κ∗Wi fully determines κ
W








i | θ, Y ∗−(κWi ,κ∗Wi )) = p(κ
∗W
i | θ, Y ∗−κ∗Wi )p(κ
W
i | θ, Y ∗−(κWi ,κ∗Wi )) (A.35)
I therefore draw κWi first, then condition on this to draw κ
∗W
i .
Drawing κWi is identical to the process used in (A.23), however now ρ
W depends
on subject characteristics, as well as the subject’s other parameters. I now use the
notation ρ̄Wi to acknowledge that this parameter is subject-specific. Since L
∗
i is mul-
tivariate normal, it follows that:
ρ̄Wi = p(κ
W
i = 1 | Y,X, θ, L∗−κWi ,κ∗Wi ) (A.36)




















where σ2κ∗W is the element of Σ corresponding to the variance of κ
∗W , Σκ∗W is a
(1× (p− 1)) vector of covariances between κ∗Wi and other elements of L∗i , and Σ−κ∗W
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is the ((p − 1) × (p − 1)) matrix left over after removing the row and column of Σ
corresponding to κ∗W
The conditional posterior for κ∗Wi is proportional to:
6
p(κ∗Wi | θ, Y ∗−κ∗Wi ) ∝ p(L
∗
i | θ)I(κ∗Wi (2κWi − 1) ≥ 0) (A.41)
Recognizing that the first term of (A.41) is the multivariate normal kernel, it follows
that κ∗Wi conditional on θ and Y
∗
−κ∗Wi
is distributed truncated normal:
κ∗Wi | θ, Y ∗−κ∗Wi ∼
T N (−∞,0) (mk∗W , vk∗W ) if κ
W
i = 0
T N [0,∞) (mk∗W , vk∗W ) if κWi = 1
(A.42)
Conditional distributions of other individual parameters rRDi , r
LT
i , and γi
These parameters are drawn using the same Metropolis-Hastings method described
in the previous section. As the parameters are correlated, the means and variances
are adjusted to reflect this, as they are in (A.39) and (A.40).
Conditional distribution of model hyperparameters (β,Σ): For the most
general model studied here, I assume that (transforms of) the individual parameters
are draws from a joint normal distribution, that is:





−1(γi)) | X ∼ N (Xiβ,Σ) (A.43)
where X is a N×k vector of subject characteristics (e.g. survey responses), β is k×p,
Σ is a p× p variance-covariance matrix, and Φ−1(·) is the inverse normal cdf.7
6Note that while κ∗Wi ∈ Y ∗i , κ∗Wi does not enter into pWi (Y ∗i | θ).
7Here, k is the number if explanatory variables used in X (including the constant term), and p = |L∗i |
is the number of latent parameters used to model the data-generating process. p = 5 if parameters
are allowed to vary between tasks, p = 3 if not.
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Inspection of (A.20) yields that elements of β and Σ appear in the likelihood
functions for both tasks, but only in the p(Zi | θ) term. These parameters also appear
in the prior term p(β,Σ). Therefore, the conditional posterior for (β,Σ) reduces to:

































Now using the following priors:
p(βj) ∼ N (βj, V j) j = 1, 2, . . . k (A.46)
H ≡ Σ−1 ∼ W(A, v) (A.47)


































where p is the number of explanatory variables contained in X. Inspection of (A.48)
reveals that:











































































noting that (A.53) is the Wishart kernel, it follows that the posterior conditional for
H is:








v = v +N
















































L∗ | θ,X ∼ N
(
X̃β̃, I ⊗ Σ
)
(A.57)
Therefore I can re-write (A.55) as:









































































which is the multivariate normal kernel. Therefore:






where: A = X̃ ′(I ⊗ Σ)−1X̃ + Ṽ −1




You  are  now  taking  part  in  an  experiment.  If  you  read  the  following  instructions  carefully,  you  can, 
depending  on  your  and  other  participants’  decisions,  earn  a  considerable  amount  of  money.  It  is 
therefore important that you take your time to understand the instructions. Please do not communicate 
with  the other participants during  the experiment. Should you have any questions, please  raise your 
hand and an experimenter will come to you to answer your question in private.  
The experiment consists of three different parts.  In each part you will be asked to make one or more 












Before beginning each part of  the experiment, you will be given  some  instructions. After  reading  the 




In Part 1, you will be placed in a group of four, including yourself and three other individuals. This group
will remain the same for all of Part 1. Part 1 consists of 20 periods. The computer will randomly select
five of these periods to be added to your earnings. Since you will not know which of the periods will be
added to your earnings until the end of the experiment, you should make your decisions in each period
as if they count for payment.
In each period, you will be randomly paired with another individual in your group. From now on we will
refer to this individual as “the other individual”. As the random parings occur each period, you will not
know whether or not you are performing this task paired with the same person or another person from
one period to the next.
Your task in each period is to choose between Action A and Action B, and also to choose between Action
C and Action D. At the same time, the other individual will also be choosing between these same two













































During the experiment, the letters denoting earnings will be replaced with numbers, so you will know
how much you could earn from taking each action
The entries in each of these tables show the earnings that result from the combination of your actions
and the other individual’s actions. The red entry on the left in each cell shows your earnings, and the
blue entry on the right shows the other individual’s earnings. For example, for the top table, if you
choose Action B and the other individual chooses Action A, then you earn x experimental dollars, and
the other individual earns a experimental dollars. Likewise, for the bottom table, if you choose Action C
and the other individual chooses Action C, then you earn c experimental dollars, and the other individual
earns c experimental dollars. If this period is chosen for payment, then in total you would earn x+c
experimental dollars, and the other individual would earn a+c experimental dollars.
In all periods except the first, you will be shown a table summarizing the actions taken by all of the
individuals in your group in all previous periods. An example of this table (with the entries blanked out),
is shown below:
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The leftmost column shows the period number. The next four columns show the number of individuals
in your group, including yourself, that chose the four possible combinations of actions in that period (if
the number is zero, it will be blanked out to make reading the rest of the table easier). The second
column from the right lists the choices you made in previous periods, and the rightmost column shows
the actions that the other individual chose. Remember that this other individual may change between
periods because the pairings change randomly in every period.
At the end of the experiment, you will be shown the results of the periods chosen for payment, and the
amounts that will be added to your earnings.
What information do the three other participants in my group have?
All participants have received the same instructions about the task in Part 1. During Part 1 they will be
shown the same table describing the task. They will see the same table summarizing actions taken by
the group in the past, except that the two rightmost columns of this table will show the action that they
took, and the action that their “other individual” took for that period.
By the time you start Part 1, all participants will have answered the questionnaire, which will appear on
your screen.
Do you have any questions? If so, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you and
answer your questions in private. Otherwise, please complete the questionnaire on your computer
screen. Remember, 20 experimental dollars will be added to your earnings for every correct answer in
this questionnaire.
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Instructions for Part 2
Part 2 of the experiment consists of 4 periods. In each period you will start with 100 tokens, each token
is worth one experimental dollar. Your task is to decide the number of tokens to invest in a lottery
described below.
An example of your task in a period (which shall not be used in the experiment) is presented below:
You have a chance of ½ (50%) to win 3.00
times the tokens you bet on the lottery, and a
½ (50%) chance that these tokens are lost.
Hence, your tokens at the end of this period are determined as follows. If you decided to put amount Y
tokens (and keep 100 – Y tokens out of the lottery), then you will have at least 100 – Y tokens at the end
of this period. In addition to this, if the lottery is successful you will have 3.00 Y additional tokens at the
end of the period. In other words, if the lottery is unsuccessful you will end the period with 100 Y
tokens, and if the lottery is successful, you will end the period with 100 Y +3.00Y tokens
You can think of the outcome of this lottery as the result of tossing a fair coin. You receive the additional
3.00Y tokens whenever the coin comes up heads.
Note that the prize of the lottery will change between periods, so please read each lottery description
carefully before making your decisions.
When you enter the number of tokens you would like to invest, we first require that you “submit” this
number to the computer. Submitting this number will calculate the tokens that you will have at the end
of the period in the case that the lottery is not successful, and the case that it is successful. An example
of the results of this calculation is presented in the figure below (the numbers are blanked out):
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Clicking “submit” will not lock in your answer, so feel free to experiment with different numbers until
you find one that you like. When you wish to lock in your answer, click “OK”.
Will other participants learn about your decisions in this Part?
No, other participants will not be informed of your decisions in this part.
How will your earnings be determined for this Part?
One decision in either Part 2 or Part 3 will be selected for payment. At the end of the experiment, the
computer will randomly select either Part 2 or Part 3 for payment. Each part is equally likely to be
selected. If Part 2 is selected, then the computer will randomly select one of the four periods in this Part.
Each period is equally likely to be selected. For the selected period, one experimental dollar will be
added to your final earnings for every token that you have at the end of this period. Since you will not
know which of the period will be added to your earnings until the end of the experiment, you should
make your decisions in each period as if they count for payment.
When will you find out about the outcomes of your decisions in this Part?
If this part is selected for payment, then you will be informed of the outcome of the lottery that was
selected for payment at the end of the experiment, after all decisions have been made.
Do you have any questions? If so, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you and
answer your questions in private. Otherwise, please complete the questionnaire on your computer
screen. Remember, 20 experimental dollars will be added to your earnings for every correct answer in
this questionnaire. Payment for correctness will occur irrespective of whether Part 2 or 3 is selected for
payment.
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Instructions for Part 3
Part 3 of the experiment consists of 4 periods. In each period you will start with 100 red tokens, and 100
blue tokens, each token is worth one experimental dollar. Your task is to decide the number of red and
blue tokens to invest in the “red lottery” and the “blue lottery”, respectively, described below.
An example of your task in a period (which shall not be used in the experiment) is presented below:
RED LOTTERY BLUE LOTTERY
You have a chance of ½ (50%) to win 2.25
times the tokens you bet on the lottery, and a
½ (50%) chance that these tokens are lost.
You have a chance of ½ (50%) to win 2.25
times the tokens you bet on the lottery, and a
½ (50%) chance that these tokens are lost.
Hence, your tokens at the end of this period are determined as follows. If you decided to put R tokens in
the red lottery (and keep 100 – R tokens out of the lottery), and put B tokens in the blue lottery (and
keep 100 – B tokens out of the lottery), then you will have at least 100 – R red tokens and 100 – B blue
tokens at the end of this period. In addition to this, if the red lottery is successful you will have 2.25 R
additional red tokens at the end of the period, and if the blue lottery is successful, you will have 2.25 B
additional blue tokens at the end of the period.
You can think of the outcomes of these lotteries as the result of tossing two fair coins, a “red coin” and a
“blue coin”. You receive the additional 2.25 R red tokens whenever the red coin comes up heads, and
you receive the additional 2.25 B blue tokens whenever the blue coin comes up heads.
Note that the prizes of the red and blue lotteries will change between periods, so please read each
lottery description carefully before making your decisions.
As in Part 2, we require that you “submit” your answers for both lotteries before clicking “OK”. Again,
submitting your answer will calculate the tokens that you will have at the end of the period in the case
that the lottery is not successful, and the case that it is successful. Clicking “submit” will not lock in your
answer, so feel free to experiment with different numbers until you find one that you like. When you
wish to lock in your answer, click “OK”.
Will other participants learn about your decisions in this Part?
No, other participants will not be informed of your decisions in this part.
How will your earnings be determined for this Part?
One decision in either Part 2 or Part 3 will be selected for payment. At the end of the experiment, the
computer will randomly select either Part 2 or Part 3 for payment (each part is equally likely to be
selected). If Part 3 is selected, then the computer will randomly select one of the four periods in this
Part (each period is equally likely to be selected), and one experimental dollar will be added to your final
earnings for every token (both red and blue) that you have at the end of this period. Since you will not
know which of the periods will be added to your earnings until the end of the experiment, you should
make your decisions in each period as if they count for payment.
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When will you find out about the outcomes of your decisions in this Part?
If this part is selected for payment, then you will be informed of the outcome of the lotteries that were
selected for payment at the end of the experiment, after all decisions have been made.
Do you have any questions? If so, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you and
answer your questions in private. Otherwise, please complete the questionnaire on your computer
screen. Remember, 20 experimental dollars will be added to your earnings for every correct answer in
this questionnaire. Payment for correctness will occur irrespective of whether Part 2 or 3 is selected for
payment.
A.5 Screenshots
Roommates’ Dilemma (Treatment 1)
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Lottery task part 1
Lottery task part 2
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B. APPENDIX FOR: MIXTURE MODELS OF BEHAVIOR
AND NUISANCE PARAMETERS: A
SEMI-PARAMETRIC BAYESIAN APPROACH
B.1 Additional notes on Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001)
B.1.1 Derivatoin of optimal choice for each type
For the PC type:
t∗i,k = arg max
t∈[0,1]
min{θPCi t, (1− t)/pk} (B.1)
θPCi t
∗





For the PS type:
t∗i,k = arg max
t∈[0,1]
t+ θPSi (1− t)/pk (B.4)
t∗i,k =
1 if pk ≥ θ
PC
i




here we assume that when indifferent, the PS type keeps the endowment.
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B.1.2 Calculation of lower bound on nuisance parameters
For the PC type, we require that when pk = 1 the lower bound on θ
PC havs a
prediction that differs by at least ε from the selfish type:
inf
θPC








For the PS type, we require that for at least one treatment the lower bound type








C. APPENDIX FOR: HOSPITAL-INSURER
BARGAINING POWER AND NEGOTIATED RATES
C.1 Understanding Variation in Fee For Service Payments
In this section, we explore the variation in FFS payments, and some of the issues
with using charge master prices as a measure of services. We assume that FFS
payments are negotiated as a fraction of charges. If all variation in FFS payments
were explained by this negotiated fraction, then a regression of log(payments) against
log(charges) should result in a coefficient of 1 on log(charges), and and R2 of 1.
Specifically, estimating the model:
log(paidj) = β0 + β1 log(chargedj) + εj (C.1)
for all patients j who were admitted at hospital h with insurance i should result in
estimates of β̂1 = 1 and R







ρhi = exp(β0) (C.3)
These ρhis tell us the fraction of charges that a homogenized patient would pay for
a particular hospital-insurer combination. As such they allow us to compare relative
prices between hospital-insurer pairs.
We begin with Table C.1 by exploring the variation in FFS payments and charges
due to characteristics such as hospital type, location, and insurance and hospital
market share. These regressions are used to motivate our analysis based on a nor-
malization of charges, rather than charges themselves.
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Before interpreting the coefficients on these regressions, it is worthwhile noting
that, given a long enough time horizon, all of these market characteristics are en-
dogenous. While we expect hospital location, teaching status, and the presence of an
emergency room to be choice variables for the hospital only in the very long run, and
hence fixed for the purposes of a particular negotiation, market share clearly varies
directly with the negotiation process. We therefore invite the reader to be cautious
in interpreting the coefficients on market shares as causal.1
We have four specifications. The first specification examines payments and charges
on a per-patient basis. The second specification explains payments considering illness
heterogeneity by interacting illness weight and hospital type. The third specifica-
tion explains charges again by considering illness heterogeneity by interacting illness
weight and hospital type. The final specification uses normalized charges to explain
payments.
In Table C.1 column (1), we regress log(payments) against log(charges), hospital
type indicators, region indicators, and measures of market share of hospitals and
insurers. For FFS payments, we expect the coefficient on log(charges) to be equal to
one. While we reject this hypothesis at the 5% level, the coefficient of 0.940 indicates
a close to linear relationship between payments and charges.2
We next turn our attention to hospital type. Of some concern in column (1) is the
negative and significant coefficient on the academic medical center (AMC) indicator.
The comparison group of hospital type is community hospitals, which we think of as
being highly substitutable. We predicted community hospitals would have limited
bargaining power. AMCs are high-quality specialized hospitals, so we expected this
1Specifically, we expect hospital (insurer) market share to be correlated with unobservable hospital
quality (insurance policy) characteristics that are important in the negotiating process. For example,
we expect higher quality hospitals to command both (i) greater market shares and (ii) greater
negotiated rates. As quality is unobserved and therefore an omitted variable, this would mean that
the estimated coefficient on market share would over-state the effect of having a greater market share.
Hence the estimates are an upper bound of the causal affect of a hospital or insurer commanding a
greater market share in the negotiation.
2One thing to observe is that this suggests that patients with higher charges may pay a slightly
smaller fraction of the bill than patients with lower charges. This may be attributable to budget
constraints. If patients pay 10% of their bills through coinsurance, patients with bills in the upper
tail of the distribution may struggle to pay even the coinsurance fraction of their bill.
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Table C.1.: Relationship between payments and charges for Fee For Service payments.
All regressions control for sex, race, ethnicity, and age (polynomial). Hospitals clas-
sified as “other specialty” have been omitted from these regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(paid) log(paid) log(charged) log(paid)
log(charged) 0.937∗∗∗
(0.0109)
Academic MC -0.481∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.0342) (0.0365) (0.0277) (0.0332)
Community DSH 0.0793∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.0361 0.160∗∗∗
(0.0352) (0.0391) (0.0297) (0.0357)
Teaching -0.0182 0.183∗∗∗ 0.0323 0.0719∗
(0.0293) (0.0331) (0.0251) (0.0292)
TraumaCenters 0.161∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.0400 0.0702∗
(0.0316) (0.0298) (0.0226) (0.0316)
Central Mass -0.0568 -0.237∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.250∗∗∗
(0.0423) (0.0473) (0.0359) (0.0425)
North East Mass -0.211∗∗∗ -0.104∗ -0.00933 -0.145∗∗∗
(0.0397) (0.0426) (0.0323) (0.0399)
Metro Boston 0.497∗∗∗ 0.0328 -0.0483 0.528∗∗∗
(0.0382) (0.0381) (0.0289) (0.0388)
South Eastern Mass 0.163∗∗∗ 0.00504 -0.220∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗
(0.0424) (0.0460) (0.0349) (0.0428)
Log hospital market share (DRG weight) 0.143∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
(0.0116) (0.0119)
Log insurer market share (DRG weight) -0.131∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(0.00451) (0.00451)
Academic MC × log(DRGweight) 0.266∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗
(0.0251) (0.0190)
Community × log(DRGweight) 0.294∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗
(0.0296) (0.0225)
Community DSH × log(DRGweight) 0.269∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗
(0.0301) (0.0228)




Constant -0.705 7.557∗∗∗ 8.116∗∗∗ 8.514∗∗∗
(0.520) (0.465) (0.352) (0.526)
Observations 43889 9797 9797 43462
R2 0.220 0.167 0.403 0.228
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
coefficient to be positive. The reason for this unexpected sign is investigated in
columns (2) and (3).
Column (2) in Table C.1 regresses log payments against various controls for mar-
ket characteristics, and investigates the relationship between DRG weights (which
capture illness heterogeneity) and payments.3 One can interpret the coefficients on
3Here we include log(weightj) interacted with all hospital type indicators to allow for more flexibility
in this relationship. Typically in specifications with interactions, one includes a ‘linear’ term for the
interacted variable alone. In this specification, however, since we interact weight with every hospital
type, to include weight (uninteracted), we would have to omit the effect of an increase in weight on
a particular hospital type.
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the hospital type indicators as (approximately) the fraction markup over a commu-
nity hospital for a DRG weight of one. Note here that academic medical centers are
estimated to receive 1.57 = exp(0.454) times the payment compared to a community
hospital for a patient with a DRG weight of 1. This coefficient, unlike the corre-
sponding coefficient in column (1), is in line with our expectations that AMCs are
the high-quality hospitals, and hence command higher prices.
The coefficient AMC × Log weight of .267 should be interpreted as follows. For
an increase in DRG weight of 1, payments would increase by a factor of exp(0.267) =
1.306, or 30.6%.
Column (3) changes the dependent variable in the regression, and regresses log(charges)
against the same regressors as column (2). This estimation highlights the discrepancy
noted in column (1) where the AMC indicator’s coefficient was expected to have a
positive sign. The coefficient on AMC in column (3) is significantly positive, indicat-
ing that AMC’s charges are uniformly higher. Therefore, an insurer with the same
negotiated rate (as a fraction of charges) at a community hospital and an AMC would
be charged more at the AMC.
Notice, though, when we compare columns (2) and (3), that AMC have much higher
charges than the community hospitals. AMCs have much higher prices than their
community counterparts, but they only get payments that are a fraction higher.
This observation motivates the normalization of charges. We normalize hospital
charges by creating a hospital charge index which compares each patient’s charges to
estimated charges at that hospital for a DRG of 1. This procedure is described in
detail in Section C.2.2.
We call this variable log(Imputed Weight) and use it instead of raw charges in
the same specification as column (1). The results of this are reported in column (4) of
Table C.1. Here we see that AMCs command payments of about 1.155 = exp(0.143)
times higher than community hospitals, and an additional 7% if they have a trauma
center. When we compare our results to Ho (2008), who estimates ‘star’ hospitals
to have markups of 25%, we find similar results (about 23%). We also include log
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market share by DRG weight, and estimate that a 1% increase in market share of
a hospital is associated with a 0.257% increase in negotiated payments, and a 1%
increase in market share of an insurer is associated with a 0.127% decline in negotiated
payments. Again, due to suspected correlation with unobservable quality attributes,
we consider these value to be upper bounds on the causal effects of these variables in
the negotiation process.
C.2 Procedure for calculating negotiated rates
Our goal is to estimate the negotiated rates between hospitals and insurers in the
market for health care. To this end, we must estimate:
1. An index of relative hospital charges. Specifically, for each hospital we estimate
the amount that a patient with a DRG weight of 1 would be charged.
2. Negotiated rates for each hospital-insurer pair (i.e. how much is paid for services
for a normalized patient4, and how this varies for each hospital-insurer pair?)
The remainder of this section outlines the procedure.
C.2.1 Index of relative hospital charges
In Section C.1,we find a patient’s charges varies greatly by hospital, even after
normalizing differences in DRG weight.5 As we aim to estimate negotiated rates
as a fraction of charges, we wish to control for this variation so that a normalized
“charge” buys the same quantity of services at each hospital.6 As a motivation for
this normalization, consider two hospitals, one with low costs and charges and one
4Normalized in this context means for a patient with a DRG weight of 1
5For example, we would imagine hospitals at the top of the referral network to treat sicker patients.
When we say we are controlling for DRG weights, what we mean is that we are comparing charges
per DRG weight. Thus we can compare charges as if patients were homogeneous and each had an
average illness.
6One can roughly think of this as the ratio of actual charges to the charges a patient would receive
if they had a weight of 1 (i.e., charges for an average patient) at that hospital. Precise details on
our methodology for constructing these normalized charges are below
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with high costs and high charges. $5,000 of charges at Hospital L(ow) would buy
more services than $5,000 at Hospital H(igh). Our normalization allows us to look at
percentage changes in service provision relative to a standard unit of service.7
We first calculate an index of hospital charges that is equal to the estimated (log)
charges that a patient with a DRG weight of 1 would receive. To achieve this, we
estimate the following equation for every hospital twice, once for FFS and once for
DRG payments:
log(chargedj) = β0,h + β1,h log(weightj) + εj (C.4)
where weightj is patient j’s DRG weight. Taking the conditional expectation of (C.4)
for a weight of 1 yields:
E
[
log(chargedj) | weightj = 1
]
= β0,h (C.5)
Using the estimated intercept from (C.4), we then construct:
log(normalized chargesj) = log(chargedj)− β̂0,h (C.6)
That is, if two patients at different hospitals have the same normalized charges, (say
1.5) we expect that they each receive 1.5 times as many services as a normalized
patient at their hospital. the same quantity of services, but their (un-normalized)
charges could be different.8 Furthermore in expectation, log(normalized chargesj) = 0
7A standard unit of service is one with a DRG weight of 1, and is not dependent on patient case
mix.
8Because this specification is in logs, this is more clear if you consider 2 patients both of who receive
2 times the average service provision at two different hospitals. Both would have a normalized
charge of 2. At hospital A, average charges may be $8,000. At hospital B, average charges may
be $10,000. The patient at Hospital A would receive $16,000 of services and at Hospital b would
receive $20,000, but each receives twice the average, so they each have a normalized charge of 2. In
this way, normalized charges tells us the relative amount of service consumption at each hospital
without explicitly comparing dollar values.
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corresponds to the quantity of services that would be provided for a DRG weight of
1.9
C.2.2 Procedure for estimating negotiated rates for FFS payments
Fee-for-service (FFS) payment arrangements are negotiated payments between a
hospital and an insurer specifying either amounts to be paid for each service provided
by the hospital, or the fraction of the hospital’s charges that will be paid. Due to the
availability of data, we make the simplifying assumption that all FFS contracts are
a negotiated fraction of charges, noting that the alternative would be a negotiated
price vector for services, say phi. If phi = ρhich for some ρhi ∈ (0, 1), where ch is
hospital h’s charge master prices, then these types of arrangements are identical.
We seek to estimate the fraction of charges that each insurer pays to each hospital.
Additionally, noting that charges for the same services vary greatly between hospitals,
we also estimate the amount paid by an insurer for one unit of normalized payments.
For a FFS arrangement, the relationship between charges and payments should
be:
paidj = ρhichargedj, ⇐⇒ log(paidj) = log(ρhi) + log(chargedj) (C.7)
where ρhi is the fraction of charges paid by insurer i at hospital h. We estimate (C.7)
by regressing log(payments) against log(charges) for all patients in a hospital-insurer
pair:
log(paidj) = β0,hi + β1,hi log(chargedj) + εj (C.8)
Hence, our estimated for negotiated rates as a fraction of services are:
ρ̂hi = exp(β̂0,hi) (C.9)
9and for small x, log(normalized chargesj) = x corresponds to a DRG weight of approximately 1+x.
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Note that between (C.7) and (C.8) we allow for β1,hi 6= 1, that payments are not
directly proportional to charges.
We also estimate the amount paid for normalized charges using the regression
equation:
log(paidj) = β0,hi + β1,hi log(normalized chargesj) + εj (C.10)
again, allowing for a nonlinear relationship between payments and normalized charges
through estimating (rather than imposing a value on) β1,hi. Our estimate of the
amount paid for a unit of normalized charges is therefore:
γ̂hi = exp(β0,hi) (C.11)
Note that the units of γ̂hi are in US dollars, while ρ̂hi is unit-free.
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C.3 Estimates of negotiated rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Aetna Blue Cross Cigna Fallon United Tufts ALL
Anna Jaques 0 1539.2 0 0 4072.7 0 2158.2
(.) (312.2) (.) (.) (1424.0) (.) (400.4)
Baystate MC 0 3320.1 7786.1 4853.6 7792.0 0 4794.6
(.) (210.6) (906.8) (617.0) (1052.4) (.) (245.9)
Baystate Franklin MC 0 2264.1 0 0 0 0 4061.5
(.) (486.9) (.) (.) (.) (.) (574.0)
Baystate Mary Lane 0 2639.7 0 0 0 0 4301.0
(.) (883.1) (.) (.) (.) (.) (979.3)
Brigham and Women’s 22001.1 7559.8 19721.4 10682.3 11954.0 13640.7 13279.2
(296.5) (193.2) (813.6) (958.8) (1003.1) (245.6) (163.9)
Signature Healthcare Brockton 0 2186.7 0 0 5639.6 7102.1 3248.0
(.) (215.4) (.) (.) (1446.4) (652.9) (274.4)
Cape Cod 10620.6 3770.7 0 0 9507.6 9897.4 6300.0
(887.0) (298.7) (.) (.) (1657.1) (666.1) (337.7)
Falmouth 0 4130.9 0 0 0 12880.7 7385.6
(.) (499.2) (.) (.) (.) (1029.8) (540.3)
Steward Norwood 0 0 0 0 5107.2 7106.3 5924.0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (1362.5) (455.0) (392.3)
Steward Carney 0 1247.1 0 0 5972.2 5910.0 3529.9
(.) (452.6) (.) (.) (1413.2) (942.0) (469.2)
Boston Children’s 14984.2 4115.8 13830.8 0 0 16476.6 7753.3
(648.9) (234.4) (1191.8) (.) (.) (746.6) (276.6)
Cooley Dickinson 0 0 0 2672.1 0 6189.5 4331.9
(.) (.) (.) (647.1) (.) (737.2) (557.2)
Beth Israel -Needham 0 1332.6 0 0 0 0 3510.8
(.) (709.7) (.) (.) (.) (.) (819.3)
Emerson 0 3645.1 0 0 5333.5 8707.9 5640.4
(.) (318.1) (.) (.) (1548.1) (504.2) (328.7)
Brigham and Women’s-Faulkner 0 3258.9 0 0 8358.4 8408.0 5785.9
(.) (360.5) (.) (.) (1838.4) (680.1) (392.8)
Harrington Memorial 0 2071.9 0 3743.8 0 0 3609.1
(.) (448.9) (.) (575.0) (.) (.) (438.0)
Health Alliance 0 0 0 3560.8 7307.0 0 4487.0
(.) (.) (.) (520.7) (1711.4) (.) (495.2)
Heywood 0 1933.4 0 2725.0 0 6122.7 3018.7
(.) (333.0) (.) (633.2) (.) (793.8) (364.6)
Steward Holy Family 0 2380.4 0 0 7229.3 7645.2 5250.3
(.) (352.1) (.) (.) (960.1) (557.3) (324.5)
Holyoke MC 0 2003.5 0 0 6521.8 0 3415.8
(.) (421.6) (.) (.) (1815.3) (.) (489.6)
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Beth Israel -Plymouth 0 2906.4 0 0 5173.5 7347.6 4219.3
(.) (291.3) (.) (.) (1862.4) (620.3) (344.7)
Lawrence General 0 0 0 1702.6 0 7638.9 5907.0
(.) (.) (.) (886.1) (.) (580.6) (523.5)
Lowell General 0 2908.2 0 0 5985.2 7898.8 4998.2
(.) (215.4) (.) (.) (963.4) (376.3) (230.6)
Massachusetts Eye and Ear 0 0 0 0 0 5013.7 4743.4
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (1165.6) (857.7)
Massachusetts General 17153.6 2823.5 14790.3 0 9857.6 12197.0 8859.3
(323.9) (157.6) (892.8) (.) (692.3) (233.0) (148.4)
Milford Regional MC 0 2541.9 0 3900.3 5065.3 8892.4 4184.2
(.) (366.5) (.) (690.7) (1771.5) (824.2) (372.0)
Beth Israel - Milton 0 1964.2 0 0 4480.5 5127.1 3493.5
(.) (445.2) (.) (.) (1862.4) (695.1) (458.9)
Morton 0 1839.7 0 0 5710.9 5596.8 3059.0
(.) (316.7) (.) (.) (1674.6) (873.4) (375.0)
Mount Auburn Hospital 0 4995.8 0 0 7668.5 0 5558.3
(.) (360.5) (.) (.) (1771.5) (.) (456.2)
New England Baptist 0 24610.1 0 0 22275.1 17304.6 20279.9
(.) (553.2) (.) (.) (2029.5) (1005.6) (541.7)
Newton-Wellesley 8682.5 3677.5 9894.2 0 7754.0 10388.0 7505.2
(433.6) (225.4) (1249.9) (.) (1308.3) (287.2) (203.0)
North Adams Regional 0 2543.9 0 0 0 0 4013.2
(.) (501.8) (.) (.) (.) (.) (663.5)
Quincy MC 0 1551.2 0 0 0 5672.4 3597.0
(.) (553.2) (.) (.) (.) (799.6) (549.3)
Steward Saint Anne’s 0 1241.2 0 0 6848.0 8204.4 4860.8
(.) (491.7) (.) (.) (1260.2) (858.5) (451.9)
South Shore 8577.8 3135.5 7649.7 0 7374.2 10134.7 6404.5
(724.2) (196.8) (1332.4) (.) (1084.8) (304.8) (201.1)
Steward St. Elizabeth’s MC 0 4354.7 0 0 8885.8 10427.9 8241.3
(.) (417.1) (.) (.) (1362.5) (408.9) (328.4)
Saint Vincent 4973.1 2871.1 0 5172.7 5929.9 9631.6 5396.6
(668.0) (358.6) (.) (240.4) (1291.7) (553.3) (217.9)
Sturdy Memorial 0 5628.2 0 0 5156.2 7138.8 5864.2
(.) (257.7) (.) (.) (1507.5) (805.6) (318.9)
Clinton 0 0 0 0 0 0 3927.5
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (954.1)
Marlborough 0 2120.3 0 3007.6 8731.3 8507.0 4458.5
(.) (515.4) (.) (1023.2) (2029.5) (1184.3) (528.9)
Winchester 0 3010.9 6241.1 0 4903.9 10028.8 6278.8
(.) (249.9) (1613.6) (.) (1592.1) (347.0) (253.3)
Wing Memorial 0 1710.9 0 0 0 0 4050.9
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(.) (819.5) (.) (.) (.) (.) (785.7)
North Shore MC 10410.2 2964.4 0 0 7242.5 10180.5 5577.3
(499.1) (241.9) (.) (.) (1413.2) (766.5) (276.4)
Boston MC 0 2828.3 0 0 5593.4 7310.2 4384.8
(.) (217.7) (.) (.) (703.9) (511.8) (236.3)
Cambridge Health Alliance 0 1471.7 0 0 3048.7 5714.7 2274.3
(.) (255.3) (.) (.) (1862.4) (746.6) (331.7)
MetroWest MC 0 1924.7 0 1568.5 5374.7 0 2393.0
(.) (250.3) (.) (905.2) (1482.1) (.) (323.6)
Hallmark Health 0 2493.4 0 0 5204.6 9299.1 5339.6
(.) (591.9) (.) (.) (1446.4) (932.5) (505.7)
Northeast 0 3438.0 0 3569.3 5297.2 9438.8 5466.6
(.) (199.7) (.) (877.1) (1372.2) (360.3) (220.1)
Southcoast 7766.9 2317.5 7651.3 3144.4 8808.1 7674.9 4748.2
(607.5) (175.7) (1493.9) (995.9) (848.7) (381.3) (194.5)
UMass Memorial MC 0 1100.5 11978.5 4698.0 7385.2 12213.5 6551.8
(.) (567.8) (1363.8) (256.9) (820.0) (491.5) (223.7)
Berkshire MC 11209.2 0 0 0 9862.0 11012.2 10150.3
(781.1) (.) (.) (.) (1136.8) (881.1) (460.7)
Lahey Clinic 0 4419.4 0 7065.2 9412.1 11588.1 7275.7
(.) (213.2) (.) (1085.3) (813.8) (415.4) (227.6)
Mercy MC 0 1787.4 0 3485.0 0 6019.0 2965.1
(.) (310.4) (.) (792.6) (.) (914.4) (374.5)
Steward Good Samaritan MC 0 2348.3 0 0 6416.5 7031.2 4392.8
(.) (249.0) (.) (.) (1362.5) (422.1) (268.1)
Beth Israel Deaconess MC 0 3317.7 9080.4 0 7741.2 14187.4 8010.5
(.) (168.9) (1007.2) (.) (755.4) (261.5) (171.6)
Observations 1267 14563 644 2188 3650 7894 31719





























Massachusetts Eye and Ear
Massachusetts General
Milford Regional MC






























Steward Good Samaritan MC
Beth Israel Deaconess MC
0 2 4 6 8 10
log(poverc) log(paid)
Fig. C.1. Restricted and unrestricted exponentiated coefficient plot for esti-
mates of coefficients on hospital indicators. The green dots show the expo-
nentiated coefficients of the restricted model, which regresses the log paid
to charged ratio against hospital and insurer indicators (uninteracted). The
red triangles show the exponentiated coefficients of the unrestricted model,
which regresses log payments against log charges, hospital indicators, and
insurer indicators (uninteracted). As the omitted hospital is Anna Jacques,
the value of the exponentiated coefficient should be interpreted as the ratio
of payments to charges relative to Anna Jacques. E.g.: a hospital with a
coefficient equal to 0.7 has an average paid to charged ratio that is 70% of
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Fig. C.2. Restricted and unrestricted exponentiated coefficient plot for
estimates of coefficients on insurer indicators. The green dots show the ex-
ponentiated coefficients of the restricted model, which regresses the log paid
to charged ratio against hospital and insurer indicators (uninteracted). The
red triangles show the exponentiated coefficients of the unrestricted model,
which regresses log payments against log charges, hospital indicators, and
insurer indicators (uninteracted). As the omitted insurer is Aetna, the
value of the exponentiated coefficient should be interpreted as the ratio of
payments to charges relative to those paid by Aetna. E.g.: an insurer with
a coefficient equal to 0.7 has an average paid to charged ratio that is 70%
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